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Is It Evolution Yet?
A Critique of Evolutionary
Archaeology1
by James L. Boone and
Eric Alden Smith

eric alden smith is Professor of Anthropology and Director of
the Graduate Program in Environmental Anthropology at the
University of Washington. Born in 1949, he received his degrees
in anthropology from the University of California, Santa Barbara
(B.A., 1972), and Cornell University (M.A., 1976; Ph.D., 1980).
His research interests are in ecological, economic, and evolutionary aspects of human behavior, particularly among foraging peoples. His recent publications include Inujjuamiut Foraging Strategies: Evolutionary Ecology of an Arctic Hunting Economy
(Hawthorne, N.Y.: Aldine de Gruyter, 1991); coedited with Bruce
Winterhalder, Evolutionary Ecology and Human Behavior (Hawthorne, N.Y.: Aldine de Gruyter, 1992); with S. A. Smith, ‘‘Inuit
Sex Ratio: Population Control, Ethnographic Artifact, or Parental
Manipulation?’’ current anthropology (35:595–624); and coedited with Joan McCarter, Contested Arctic: Indigenous Peoples, Nation-States, and Circumpolar Environments (Seattle: University of Washington Press, in press).
The present paper was submitted 23 ix 96 and accepted 4 iii 97;
the find version reached the Editor’s office 16 v 97.

The application of Darwinian evolutionary theory to archaeology
has taken two divergent and rather distinct paths over the past
two decades. According to one program, often referred to as evolutionary archaeology, cultural change as seen in the archaeological record can best be explained in terms of the direct action of
natural selection and other Darwinian processes on heritable variation in artifacts and behavior. The other approach, referred to as
evolutionary or behavioral ecology, explains cultural and behavioral change as forms of phenotypic adaptation to varying social
and ecological conditions, using the assumption that natural selection has designed organisms to respond to local conditions in
fitness-enhancing ways. We argue that the primary conflict between the two approaches centers on fundamental differences in
the way they view the explanatory role of phenotypic variation
and more specifically a disagreement over whether behavioral innovation is random with respect to adaptive value (including related issues of current versus future selective advantage and the
explanatory role of intentions). These differences lead to contrasts in explanatory scope, empirical application, and theoretical
conclusions, which in turn provide the basis for our evaluation
of the relative utility of each approach for explaining archaeological phenomena.
james l. boone is Associate Professor of Anthropology at the
University of New Mexico (Albuquerque, N.M. 87131-1086,
U.S.A.). Born in 1949, he received his B.A. (1972) at the University of Texas at Austin and his M.A. and Ph.D. (1977 and 1980)
at the State University of New York at Binghamton. His theoretical interests are in human evolutionary ecology and archaeology,
particularly in the evolution of status reinforcement behavior
and conspicuous consumption. His publications include ‘‘Competition, Cooperation, and the Development of Social Hierarchies’’
(in Evolutionary Ecology and Human Behavior, edited by E. A.
Smith and B. Winterhalder, New York: Aldine de Gruyter, 1992);
with J. E. Myers and C. L. Redman, ‘‘Archeological and Historical Approaches to Complex Societies: The Islamic States of Medieval Morocco’’ (American Anthropologist 92:630–46); and ‘‘Parental Investment and Elite Family Structure in Preindustrial States:
A Case Study of Medieval–Early Modern Portuguese Genealogies’’ (American Anthropologist 88:859–78).

1. For comments on earlier versions of this paper, we thank Don
Grayson, Bob Leonard, Jim O’Connell, Ann Ramenofsky, Julie
Stein, Bruce Winterhalder, and four anonymous reviewers. We are
grateful to Ramenofsky and Winterhalder for permission to quote
from unpublished manuscripts. We have no doubt that each of
these scholars disagrees with at least something in this paper, but
they have been gracious critics nonetheless. In any case, we are
solely responsible for the errors, opinions, and interpretations expressed herein.

Over the past two decades, a number of programmatic
statements advocating the application of Darwinian
theory to archaeological phenomena have appeared in
the literature. According to one program, cultural
change as seen in the archaeological record can best be
explained in terms of the direct action of natural selection and other Darwinian processes on heritable variation in artifacts and behavior (Dunnell 1980, 1989;
Leonard and Jones 1987; O’Brien and Holland 1990,
1992; O’Brien 1996; Neff 1992, 1993; Teltser 1995b). We
will refer to this research program as ‘‘evolutionary archaeology’’ and its practitioners as ‘‘evolutionary archaeologists’’ (or, following their own usage, as ‘‘selectionists’’).
Evolutionary archaeologists repeatedly stress that
their program represents an epistemological or metaphysical (Dunnell 1980) break with other archaeological
and anthropological approaches. Their ambition is
clearly one of paradigm replacement rather than supplementation or division of labor: ‘‘those who espouse a selectionist approach are in a struggle for the attention of
the profession. It is our goal to effect a complete paradigm shift within archaeology, not simply to amuse
ourselves with academic debates’’ (O’Brien and Holland
1995:193–94). In its boldest formulations, evolutionary
archaeology dismisses all past explanations of cultural
and technological change as vitalistic and unscientific
and proposes in their place a system of explanation in
which natural selection, drift, and possibly other evolutionary forces explain changes in artifact frequencies
without any recourse to human agency, decision making, or behavioral reconstruction.
Contemporary with this development has been the
introduction into archaeology and ethnography of a
body of theory known as evolutionary or behavioral
ecology (e.g., Bettinger 1980, 1991; Hegmon 1989; Kelly
1995; Metcalf and Barlow 1992; Mithen 1989a, 1990;
O’Connell 1995; Russell 1988; Winterhalder and Smith
1981; Smith and Winterhalder 1992a; for a comprehensive overview, see Krebs and Davies 1991 or 1997). Evolutionary ecology explains cultural and behavioral
S141
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change as forms of phenotypic adaptation to varying social and ecological conditions, using the assumption
that natural selection has designed organisms to respond to local conditions in fitness-enhancing ways.
Taking this assumption of adaptive design as a starting
point, evolutionary ecologists formulate and test formal
models incorporating specific optimization goals, currencies, and constraints.
Judging from the virtual lack of cross-referencing in
the literature, these two programs seem to view each
other as irrelevant at best and mutually exclusive or
even antagonistic at worst. How can it be that two programs that derive from the same overarching theoretical framework—Darwinism—arrive at such different
views on how to describe and explain the archaeological
record? We argue that the primary conflict between the
two approaches centers on fundamental differences in
the way they view the role of phenotypic variation, and
in particular behavioral variation, in the evolutionary
process. From these differences flow a series of consequences in explanatory scope, empirical application,
and theoretical conclusions. The aim of this paper is to
outline these differences and to evaluate the relative
utility of each approach for explaining archaeological
phenomena.
Although the relationship between evolutionary archaeology and evolutionary ecology may seem to be a
rather arid academic dispute turning on some esoteric
points of evolutionary theory, we feel that the implications for future research in archaeology and on culture
change generally are quite broad. If the proponents of
evolutionary archaeology are correct, a clean sweep of
existing paradigms in archaeology and even ethnography is scientifically warranted. Given the powerful,
unifying role of Darwinian theory in the life sciences
and the fractured state of theory in the social sciences,
evolutionary archaeology’s claim to the mantle of Darwinism comes at a significant moment in the history of
anthropology. For this reason, we have endeavored to
use the simplest, least ambiguous language possible in
order to make this critique accessible to a broad audience of professionals who may not have expertise in archaeology or evolutionary theory. Of course, there are
other critiques of evolutionary archaeology in the recent literature (e.g., Schiffer 1996), but unlike these our
critique is rooted in an acceptance of the general Darwinian framework; in other words, we locate the weakness of evolutionary archaeology in its flawed grasp of
evolutionary biology rather than in its advocacy of Darwinism per se.
We begin with a brief outline of the fundamental
logic of natural selection, noting the critical distinction
between phenotypes (such as behavioral patterns) and
replicators (such as genes). We argue that in many cases
the process that evolutionary archaeologists are calling
‘‘selection’’ is not selection at all but phenotypic adaptation to environmental variation; we illustrate this
process using two examples from the archaeological and
ethnographic records. We then take up a central disagreement between evolutionary archaeology and evo-

lutionary ecology, the issue of whether behavioral variation is undirected with respect to adaptive value
(including the related issues of current versus future selective advantage and the explanatory role of intentions). Finally, we contrast the evolutionary archaeological approach to explaining archaeological change with
that of evolutionary ecology, using the origins of plant
domestication as a heuristic example. We conclude
with a brief assessment of the archaeological promise of
each approach.

What Is Evolving? Replicators
and Phenotypes
In modern synthetic Darwinian theory, evolutionary
change proceeds through the action of natural selection
and other forces (e.g., mutation, drift) on genotypic variation and its phenotypic expression. Of these, only selection produces cumulative, directional (nonrandom),
and creative evolution. As noted by Lewontin (1970)
and many others (e.g., Dunnell 1980:38), in outline natural selection requires only three conditions: variation,
inheritance (transmission), and differential fitness. But
because of the translation between genotype and phenotype—a process inextricably linked to environmental
and developmental factors—and the complexities of inheritance wherever sexual reproduction is present, the
simplicity of evolution by natural selection is nested
within an extremely complex ontogenetic and populational context. Thus, a somewhat fuller outline of the
evolutionary process would be as follows: (1) genetic
variation is continually produced by mutation and recombination; (2) this variation interacts with external
environmental factors to shape phenotypes; (3) these
phenotypes and associated genotypes are differentially
successful in surviving and reproducing; (4) offspring inherit (some of) the genes and thus tend to develop the
associated phenotypes of their parents; (5) the proliferation of more successful genotypes results in transgenerational increase in phenotypes that are better adapted
to local environments.
In adopting the Darwinian framework, evolutionary
archaeologists have simply substituted phenotypic variation for genetic, arguing that evolution by natural selection applies to any population of entities characterized by heritable variation and differential replication
success of the variants. They further argue that since
artifacts are a component of the human phenotype,
changes in artifact frequencies through time can be explained by the same principles used in evolutionary biology, that is, the action of selection on phenotypic
variation. This position is clearly stated in various passages (e.g., Leonard and Jones 1987:213; O’Brien and
Holland 1992:37), including the following: ‘‘Artifacts do
not ‘represent’ or ‘reflect’ something else that is amenable to evolutionary theory; they are a part of the human
phenotype. Consequently, artifact frequencies are explicable by the same processes as those in biology’’
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(Dunnell 1989:45). In this view, the forces or processes
that give rise to phenotypic variation are unimportant
to the analysis of evolutionary change. All that matters
is that variation have some heritable component and
that this variation have differential fitness effects such
that natural selection can occur. In evolutionary archaeological theory, the production of new phenotypic variation (including novel forms of behavior or artifacts) is
seen as conceptually analogous to the process by which
new variants arise in the genetic code—undirected mutation and recombination.
Although seemingly straightforward, this approach to
evolution by natural selection makes some very problematic assumptions. Foremost among these is the way
it handles the genotype-phenotype distinction. To be
sure, the heritability requirement does not specify that
inheritance be genetic; it could in principle be cultural
(the standard view in evolutionary archaeology). But selection does require that there be replicators—units of
heritable variation. As Dawkins (1978; 1982:81–117)
and others (e.g., Hull 1980) have pointed out, replicators
must have certain causally significant qualities: longevity (they last for many generations), fecundity (they produce copies of themselves), and copy fidelity (they are
replicated with near-perfect accuracy). Genes, consisting of DNA, and memes or ‘‘culturgens’’ (symbolically or neurologically encoded information transmitted via social learning) are the two most commonly
identified replicators.2
The particulate nature of inheritance—the crucial
fact that individuals (phenotypes, or ‘‘vehicles,’’ as
Dawkins terms them) do not themselves replicate but
are dissolved each generation—has profound implications for evolutionary theory (e.g., Williams 1966, Dawkins 1982, Sterelny and Kitcher 1988). For one, it means
that selection will generally design individuals to behave in ways that will lead to maximal representation
of replicators in future generations. This in turn focuses
analytical attention on the relationships between replicators, vehicles, and phenotypic traits; all these elements play crucial but quite distinctive roles in biological evolution.
How has evolutionary archaeology dealt with this
critical issue? According to Dunnell (1980:87), ‘‘Perhaps
the most fundamental problem in developing evolutionary theory for cultural phenomena is the matter of
the unit of transmission. . . . Yet if evolutionary theory
is to be applied in archaeology with any rigor at all, this
issue has to be addressed in concrete terms.’’ Despite
this pronouncement, the mechanics of inheritance and
their critical consequences for the form that evolutionary processes take have been virtually ignored in the
evolutionary archaeological literature (with the notable
exception of Neiman 1995). Indeed, we are told that the
specific mechanisms of inheritance are irrelevant:
‘‘knowledge of how inheritance is effected is not neces2. Other nominees for replicator status include immunological antigens (Burnet 1959, Ada and Nossal 1987) and neural circuits in
Edelman’s (1987) ‘‘neural Darwinism’’ theory of learning.

sary nor is a knowledge of the source of variability’’
(Dunnell 1980:62).
In his recent paper entitled, provocatively enough,
‘‘What Is It That Actually Evolves?’’ Dunnell (1995) discusses the possible evolutionary relationships between
individuals, species, assemblages, and societies but
never acknowledges the replicator-phenotype distinction or the issues raised by nonparental cultural transmission. This omission is striking given the central role
that these matters have played in contemporary evolutionary theory in general and cultural evolutionary theory in particular (e.g., Dawkins 1976, Hamilton 1996,
Sober 1984, Trivers 1985, and Williams 1966 for biology; Boyd and Richerson 1985, Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman 1981, Dennett 1996, and Durham 1991 for cultural
evolution). By making artifacts the evolutionary unit
subject to variation and selection, evolutionary archaeologists are either ignoring the replicator-phenotype
distinction and all its implications or proposing that artifacts themselves are replicators; either position is
highly problematic.
In biology, phenotypes are defined as the observable
result of the interaction between genotype and environment (Mayr 1976:10)—essentially all features of an organism except its genes. Obviously, behavior is included in this encompassing definition, even behavior
that is culturally transmitted. Evolutionary archaeological theorists have argued that artifacts, being ‘‘the
equivalents of physical and behavioral traits’’ (Leonard
and Jones 1987:215), are what Dunnell (1989:44) has
colorfully termed ‘‘the hard parts of the behavioral segment of phenotypes.’’ Recently, some evolutionary archaeologists have employed Dawkins’s (1978, 1982) notion of the ‘‘extended phenotype’’ as a justification for
viewing artifacts as phenotypic traits, arguing that just
as biologists ‘‘routinely include such things as spider
webs and bird nests in their concept of phenotype, we
see no reason not to extend in similar fashion the notion of the human phenotype to include such things as
projectile points and pottery, or . . . such artifacts as ceremonial architecture’’ (O’Brien and Holland 1995:181).
But if behavior and its products (artifacts) are phenotypic—a position we agree with—then in order to apply
Darwinian analysis to them we must determine what
replicators are associated with them. More fundamental, Darwinian analysis must examine the ways in
which phenotypic traits affect the replication success of
their associated replicators. Since evolutionary archaeology has failed to do so, there is no logical foundation
for Dunnell’s (1989:45) claim (quoted above) or the following: ‘‘Since selection works on the phenotype—the
vehicle that carries and protects the germ-line replicators (the genes)—then, with regard to humans, those
things they manufacture and use to modify their environment are subject to selection in the same way any
somatic feature is’’ (O’Brien and Holland 1995:181). The
problem with this conceptualization is that selection
can act on phenotypic variation (e.g., artifact design and
frequency) only to the extent that it is heritable—that
is, correlated with replicators transmitted from parent
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to offspring (or, in the case of cultural replicators, from
model to recipient). The evolutionary archaeological
program assumes this correlation without further examination and often without even articulating the assumption. Furthermore, given that evolutionary archaeology is positing cultural inheritance, its failure to pay
attention to the effect of cultural transmission pathways (e.g., parental versus nonparental, generational
versus peer-to-peer, one-to-many versus many-to-one)
as well as secondary forces such as evolved preferences
is puzzling. Though its proponents often cite the theoretical literature on cultural evolution (e.g., Boyd and
Richerson 1985, Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman 1981, Durham 1991), they do not discuss the conclusion of this
theory that cultural transmission might sometimes produce evolutionary trajectories that differ radically from
those governing traits linked to Mendelian inheritance.
Evolutionary ecology takes a different and conceptually more complex but realistic view of phenotypic variation. It holds that organisms (including humans) have
been designed by selection to make extensive adaptive
adjustments of their phenotypes. A nonbehavioral example of this is the tanning response found in all but
the darkest-skinned or albino people. Tanning is clearly
phenotypic variation, even when it involves historical,
intergenerational change (e.g., a population that has
gone from working in the fields to working in factories
and exhibits a diachronic shift in the frequency or intensity of tanning). In the behavioral realm, this process
of adaptive phenotypic variation involves the interaction between genetically or culturally evolved cognitive
mechanisms and variable environmental conditions.
Under this view, natural selection’s primary role lies in
accounting for these cognitive mechanisms—that is,
why they evolved and why they work the way they
do—and not in culling behavioral variation. Correspondingly, environment plays a causal role in eliciting
phenotypic variation, not just a selective one after the
fact. In colloquial terms, the evolutionary ecological position is nothing more than a claim that organisms have
problem-solving abilities at various levels (physiological, morphological, behavioral) and scales (short-term,
developmental, lifelong).
A phenotype’s tendency or capacity to respond differentially to varying environmental conditions is called
phenotypic plasticity (or lability). The phenotypic plasticity of a given replicator (e.g., genotype) over a range of
environmental conditions is termed its reaction norm
(Lewontin 1974:404; Stearns 1992:61–65). In this
view—standard within biology in general, including
evolutionary ecology—phenotypic variation that results from the interaction of genotype with environment does not itself constitute evolutionary change,
though an organism’s capacity for adaptive phenotypic
plasticity is an evolved trait shaped by natural selection. If the phenotype’s reaction norm is very broad, the
potential for synchronic variation or diachronic change
in the phenotype without any evolutionary change per
se (i.e., without changes in the frequency of heritable

traits or heritable variances of traits) is correspondingly
great.
Behavior is typically the most labile component of an
organism’s phenotype. As contemporary evolutionary
biologists see it, the evolutionary raison d’être of behavior is to allow organisms greater flexibility in responding to variable environmental challenges in ways
that enhance survival and reproduction (Dawkins 1976:
chap. 4; Pulliam and Dunford 1980:chaps. 1–3). In other
words, behavioral plasticity allows organisms to adapt
to changes in environmental conditions more rapidly
than they could through the process of selection acting
on genetic variation. Thus, even though this plasticity
exacts fitness costs (in terms of development, metabolic
maintenance, and potential malfunction), in particular
niches it more than repays these costs and hence has
evolved by natural selection.
Evolutionary ecology generally analyzes phenotypic
variation in terms of ‘‘adaptive strategies’’—that is, as
a series of fitness-enhancing behavioral responses to different environmental states (assuming that these states
have been recurrent within the evolutionary history of
the organism’s lineage and that the responses fall
within its norm of reaction). This form of phenotypic
response is thus construed to be based on a set of
evolved ‘‘decision rules’’ (Krebs 1978)—genetically
evolved cognitive mechanisms that guide development,
learning, problem solving, and stimulus response.
Hence, in this view behavioral variation itself is not the
direct product of natural selection. Rather, selection enters the explanation only indirectly, as the process that
designed the behaving organism (or in fact its ancestors)
to respond facultatively and adaptively to particular environmental conditions.
Most writers of both approaches seem to agree on the
theoretical importance of cultural transmission to an
evolutionary understanding of historical change. For example, without it evolutionary archaeology could make
no claim that phenotypic variation is heritable, one of
the three essential requirements of the theory of evolution by natural selection. At the same time, the two approaches diverge in their treatment of phenotypic traits.
Evolutionary archaeology treats these (especially artifacts) as both vehicles (phenotypic) and replicators (directly subject to natural selection). In contrast, evolutionary ecology expects the transmission of cultural
variants to be heavily influenced by previously evolved
cognitive biases or decision rules. If the latter view is
correct, frequency changes in these variants over time
may be caused by factors other than concurrent natural
selection.

Selection or Phenotypic Adaptation? Two
Examples from the Archaeological Record
Evolutionary ecologists and evolutionary archaeologists
seem to agree that ‘‘natural selection is the primary ex-
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planatory mechanism in scientific evolution’’ (Dunnell
1980:49). Selection operates as a mechanism or process
of evolutionary change in a population when some variable heritable trait has correspondingly variable effects
on the fitness of the individuals that inherit it. For example, one major component of fitness is the number
of offspring that survive to reproduce; parents that produce more surviving offspring relative to others in the
same population are said to have higher reproductive
success. A heritable trait that causes its bearers to have
higher reproductive success than others in the population will increase in frequency within the population
over time.
Evolutionary archaeologists have tended to consider
all directional phenotypic change through time as the
result of natural selection acting directly on cultural
variation (Dunnell 1978). Yet most of the evolutionary
archaeological literature is quite unclear on the mechanism(s) underlying selection. Some (e.g., O’Brien and
Holland 1995:190–91; Ramenofsky 1995:135–39) suggest that selection works via reproductive differences
among the individuals who utilize certain variable artifacts to interact with the environment. Others (e.g.,
Leonard and Jones 1987:214; Jones, Leonard, and Abbott
1995:28–29; Teltser 1995a:5–6) argue that it is replicative success of phenotypic traits (behavior or artifacts)
that matters, whether or not this is tied to reproductive
success. Sometimes this ambiguity concerning the
mechanism(s) of selection is directly indicated, as in
Jones et al.’s (p. 26) reference to ‘‘functional traits, and
the processes that influence their differential survival,
collectively termed selection.’’ Most selectionists simply avoid stating a position on the issue or do not recognize it as an issue.3
In contrast, evolutionary ecology argues that selection acting on heritable variation is but one of several
processes by which changes in the frequency of phenotypic variants through time occurs. As we have suggested, one of the most important of these processes is
individual phenotypic variation in response to environmental variation such as exogenous changes in prey
abundance, climate change, and the like—in other
words, nongenetic adaptation to local (and locally variable) conditions. Evolutionary ecology also proposes
that the aggregate consequences of individual phenotypic adaptation can both change environmental conditions—as through increases in population density,
resource depletion, habitat modification, or mate
availability—and elicit new strategic phenotypic adaptation to these altered conditions. Thus, quite complex
and directional changes in phenotypic variation over
historical time are expected to result from the mecha3. Recently, some evolutionary archaeologists (Jones, Leonard, and
Abbott 1995:28; Ramenofsky 1995) have suggested that nonrandom or directional frequency change of traits can also be due to
‘‘sorting’’ (differential persistence of evolved lineages [Vrba and
Gould 1986]) or some other type of correlation with traits undergoing selection. To date, however, no publication has explored the
archaeological implications of this proposed mechanism.

nisms of phenotypic adaptation privileged in evolutionary ecology.
Behavioral variation of the type just discussed will
produce corresponding variation in the kinds and frequencies of artifacts and ecofacts associated with these
behaviors, including those which become part of the archaeological record. Hence, the resulting variation and
directional change that we observe archaeologically
cannot be assumed to have resulted from natural selection acting on culturally transmitted variation; it could
instead be the result of facultative behavioral strategies
that are themselves the product of earlier evolutionary
processes extending back thousands or millions of
years. Thus, if we wish to explain variation in the archaeological record (or any other manifestation of human behavior), we have at least two alternatives: we
can attribute this variation to the action of natural selection on adaptively random cultural variation (the
evolutionary archaeological program), or we can attribute it to adaptive phenotypic variation (the evolutionary ecological program).
In sum, analyzing synchronic variation or diachronic
change requires that we consider two distinct causal
processes, one evolutionary and the other phenotypic.
Evolutionary ecologists tend to focus on strategic phenotypic response and assume that the trait under study
has been designed by natural selection to have sufficient phenotypic plasticity to track environmental variation optimally (i.e., in fitness-maximizing ways).
Hence, they do not equate phenotypic variation with
evolutionary change; instead, they attribute it to
evolved capacities for adaptive variation (behavioral,
physiological, etc.). The evolutionary archaeological
paradigm, in contrast, minimizes the role of phenotypic
adaptation via decision making and ascribes adaptive
change to the action of natural selection on culturally
inherited phenotypic variation. Neither view is likely
to be 100% correct, but we argue that the evolutionary
ecological approach is likely to explain a much larger
proportion of the phenotypic change preserved in the archaeological and ethnographic records. We will now examine this issue and illustrate these principles with reference to two cases of historical change.
the emergence of broad-spectrum foraging
in the archaic
Our first example concerns changes in prey choice that
are revealed in the archaeological record of the North
American Archaic. This period is generally characterized by a major shift in hunting emphasis from largebodied game to smaller prey and in many cases a greater
emphasis on gathering and processing of wild plant
foods (Bayham 1979). This trend has been closely documented in Central California by Broughton (1994); a
parallel trend occurred in many regions of the Old
World during the Mesolithic. In the language of foraging
theory, the trend can be characterized in terms of an increase in diet breadth (Broughton 1994:501), wherein
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‘‘change in emphasis’’ is defined as a process by which
human foragers broaden the range of prey taken by progressively adding lower-ranked (i.e., less efficiently harvested) prey types to a previously narrower diet of
higher-ranked prey types (Smith 1983a, Kaplan and Hill
1992).
Why would humans expand their prey choice to include lower-ranked prey types? Broughton (1994, 1995)
uses optimal foraging theory to generate a number of
hypotheses about patterns of prehistoric prey choice in
Central California, including the central one that a decline in the abundance of more profitable (higherranked) large-bodied prey, such as artiodactyls (deer and
elk) and sea otters, led to an expansion of the optimal
(and hence observed) diet to include more lower-ranked
prey such as shellfish, small game, and fish. Broughton
suggests that the per-capita decline in high-ranked prey
was due to long-term increase in human population
density, but the optimal-prey-choice model would predict the same broadening of the diet in the case of anthropogenic resource depletion. Climatic change may
also have been responsible for this decline in highranked prey in some regions.
Whatever the cause, foraging theory predicts that reduced encounter rates for higher-ranked resources will
eventually shift the optimal (efficiency-maximizing)
diet breadth to include lower-ranked (higher-cost) resources (Charnov 1976, Stephens and Krebs 1986). This
is because the increased search time resulting from declining encounter rates for high-ranked prey reduces the
overall return rate for specializing on such prey relative
to the returns that can be obtained from expanding the
diet to include lower-ranked but more frequently encountered prey types.4 Thus, evolutionary ecology explains the trend toward broad-spectrum foraging in the
Archaic in terms of the long-term aggregate consequences of changing individual decisions of Archaic
foragers in response to declining availability of largebodied animals. From this perspective, adaptive phenotypic flexibility (decision making) is entirely sufficient
to explain the trend in question, and no appeal to selection acting on cultural variation is necessary. Natural
selection is required only to explain why Archaic foragers (in common with human and nonhuman foragers
everywhere) have evolved the cognitive capabilities to
make adaptive economic decisions.
snowmobiles in the subarctic
The above example of adaptive change centered largely
around changes in resource choice. Of course, the Archaic and Mesolithic periods are also characterized by
the appearance and spread of a wide range of tools, im4. There are significant complications involved in applying this
optimal-prey-choice logic to central-place foragers utilizing multiple patches; these issues are reviewed in general terms by Stephens
and Krebs (1986), Smith (1991), and Kaplan and Hill (1992) and discussed in detail for the prehistoric California case by Broughton
(1995).

plements, and facilities for capturing, processing, and
storing the animal and plant foods that were added to
the diet. Since the techniques for making and using
such implements must have spread through some process of cultural transmission—that is, we do not imagine that each Archaic forager reinvented, say, the sidenotched point or seed-beater basketry as needed—one
might argue that here is where evolutionary archaeology’s selectionist paradigm should come into full play.
But again, we must keep in mind that natural selection
acting on culturally transmitted variation is not necessarily the only or even the most important process responsible for the spread of innovations and corresponding artifact frequency changes. From the evolutionary
ecological perspective, adaptive phenotypic plasticity
(decision making and selective imitation) is a more
plausible alternative.
To illustrate this point we shift our attention to a
more recent example of technological change in foraging strategies that allows us to examine the actual process of change in more detail. In an article on Native
American artifact replacement by European goods, Ramenofsky (n.d.) posits that the rapid increase in European horses in the 16th century and the Cree use of
snowmobiles (Winterhalder 1980, 1981) are ‘‘clear examples of variants that increase due to selection’’ (n.d.:
7, emphasis added). With respect to the Cree use of
snowmobiles, we are in a good position to examine this
claim more closely.
At the time of his field study (which took place in
1975), Winterhalder found that snowmobiles had come
into general use among the Boreal Forest Cree, with
considerable effect on their foraging strategies. If Ramenofsky’s claim that this process is due to selection
rather than decision making is correct, we must imagine the following course of events to have occurred:
First, some Cree foragers adopted, for whatever reasons,
the use of snowmobiles in hunting, while others continued to walk to hunting sites on snowshoes. The snowmobile users then experienced higher fitness in the
form of larger numbers of surviving offspring, perhaps
because of greater foraging returns that could be used to
feed more offspring or because of higher return rates
that freed time to engage in other fitness-increasing activities, such as mating, child care, and wage earning.
Snowmobile use was then transmitted culturally to the
offspring of snowmobile adopters. Since hunting resources are ultimately limited, the resulting increase in
snowmobile use eventually led to replacement of snowshoe hunters by snowmobile users.
Clearly, the process just outlined would be quite
slow, requiring many generations to result in the replacement of snowshoe hunting by snowmobiles, the
number of generations depending upon the fitness differential between snowmobile users and traditional
hunters. Yet Winterhalder (1981:88) reports that the
Cree adopted snowmobiles over the space of less than
one human generation. Hence, it seems clear to us that
the rapid increase of snowmobile use, contra Ramenof-
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sky, cannot be due to the effect of natural selection acting on variation in locomotion techniques among the
Cree.
Two objections to our argument might be raised at
this point. First, given the short time involved, one
might question whether Ramenofsky really means that
natural selection is the process or mechanism responsible for the increase in the frequency of snowmobile use.
Our interpretation that she does is bolstered by her recent discussion of the spread of the horse among historic Plains Indians (1995:138–39, emphasis added):
Within 100 years of its introduction, the horse had
diffused as far east as Texas, north into Canada, and
south into Mexico (Ewers 1955). This rapidity suggests that the horse was a functional trait that
greatly increased the fitness of individuals within
populations. The strength of the horse out-competed humans and dogs as a means of transport; the
speed of the horse gave it a unique advantage in
hunting. Consequently, individuals who owned
horses reproduced in greater numbers than others.
Clearly Ramenofsky sees the advantages of horses as
leading to their spread through natural selection (of cultural variation) rather than through adaptive decision
making, and since she has recently (n.d.) linked this
case with the Cree shift from snowshoes to snowmobiles and termed both the result of ‘‘selection,’’ we
think our interpretation of what she means by ‘‘selection’’ is correct.
Second, one might question whether ‘‘selection’’ on
cultural variation must act through differences in biological reproduction. As discussed in detail by cultural
evolution theorists (e.g., Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman
1981, Boyd and Richerson 1985), since cultural inheritance is not limited to parent-offspring transmission,
the replication rate of memes need not be constrained
by the generation length of culture bearers. Thus, some
memes may spread ‘‘horizontally’’ (e.g., between peers)
or even ‘‘obliquely’’ (from elders to various sets of nondescendant juniors) in a rapid fashion more akin to epidemics than to genetic inheritance. However, if (as in
the example discussed here) the postulated evolutionary mechanism is natural selection, then differential
transmission requires heritable variation in individual
survival and/or individual reproductive success, and
therefore generation length becomes an important ratelimiting constraint. The alternative that ‘‘snowmobile
memes’’ were transmitted more effectively than ‘‘snowshoe memes’’ to nondescendant Cree (as well as offspring), while plausible, is not natural selection; more
significant, it requires precisely the kind of adaptive decision making that evolutionary archaeology is dedicated to eliminating from archaeological explanation.
How, then, can we characterize this process of change
within the framework of evolutionary theory? We
would argue that increased snowmobile use is the result
of the fact that Cree hunters, like all humans, inherit

evolved cognitive capabilities that allow them to perceive the relative efficiency of different means (e.g.,
snowmobiles versus snowshoes) for acquiring resources
and to make decisions regarding adoption of new technology or patterns of behavior according to which will
produce the highest net gains.5
We argue that adopting such an explanatory strategy
allows for a much richer analysis of change as well. For
example, Winterhalder argued that the Cree adopted
snowmobiles because doing so increased foraging efficiency by reducing the amount of time it took to travel
from settlements to hunting areas; in optimal foraging
terms, snowmobiles decrease prey search time. Using
the optimal foraging framework allowed Winterhalder
to make various predictions regarding changes in the
variety and range of prey taken upon encounter with the
adoption of snowmobiles. Specifically, an increase in
search efficiency is predicted to result in a constriction
of the diet (1981:89); Cree hunters using motorized
transport should concentrate on more profitable prey
such as moose and ignore lower-ranking prey with
lower return rates such as hare. As it turned out, Winterhalder was able to confirm that Cree diet was broader
prior to the adoption of snowmobiles and outboards. We
note that without the evolutionary ecological postulate
that evolved cognitive abilities allow foragers to weigh
the economic costs and benefits of various tactics and
strategies and to choose the tactic or strategy that gives
the highest energy return under the circumstances, the
intimate strategic relationship between foraging technology and diet breadth would remain theoretically
opaque.
discriminating phenotypic from
evolutionary change
It might be argued that, if natural selection and adaptive
decision making have the same outcome (e.g., snowmobile adoption) and enhance fitness in either case, it
doesn’t matter whether we adopt the evolutionary archaeological or the evolutionary ecological explanation.
Now, it is true that adaptive decision making over a
short time scale may produce results (including fitness
effects) that are equivalent to the effect of natural selection acting over longer time scales. This is largely because capabilities for phenotypic adaptation (including
adaptive decision making) are themselves the product
of past natural selection. However, this does not mean
that the two processes of adaptive change should be
5. Just how detailed and fine-tuned these cognitive mechanisms are
and how they are shaped by inheritance or learning are empirical
matters that evolutionary ecologists are continually investigating
in humans and nonhumans. For example, how closely can people
or other organisms discriminate different mean rates of energy
gain, given variance in these rates over time? How extensively are
other components of fitness (e.g., mortality risk) traded off against
resource capture rate? What are the relative roles of genetic and
cultural inheritance in shaping these decision rules? We think it
premature to take strong positions on these issues.
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conflated or that we can assume they will always produce the same outcomes. The reasons for this have
some rather far-reaching implications for how we
should view variation, selection, and evolutionary
change.
First, natural selection results in trait frequency
changes through time by favoring some variants and
culling out others; the basis of this culling process is the
differential success of replicators, generally via differential survival and fertility of organisms that exhibit the
variant traits and transmit the variant replicators undergoing selection. This means that the rapidity with
which selection can act is significantly constrained by
the generation span of the organism in question. Second, the strength of selection depends on (1) the amount
of variation already existing in the population and
(2) the degree of differential fitness that the variant
traits confer on the individuals carrying them—mathematical features of natural selection enshrined in every
textbook on the subject.6 In contrast, the rapidity with
which phenotypic response to changing environmental
conditions occurs is dependent not on the amount of
variation that already exists in a population but on the
rapidity with which environmental change is occurring.
Nor is the rapidity with which innovations can spread
though learning or cultural transmission necessarily dependent on the amount of preexisting phenotypic variance. This is because innovations or variants can increase in frequency in a population not just through a
culling process acting upon existing variation but because they in some way satisfy evolved preferences or
decision rules better than do existing variants (Boyd and
Richerson 1985:175). In other words, although traits
adopted though social learning may well affect fitness,
their increase or decrease in frequency through time is
not necessarily through the mechanism of differential
reproduction. We believe this point is critical for understanding phenomena such as the adoption of horses or
snowmobiles.

Is Behavioral Variation Analogous
to Mutation?
the concept of undirected variation
A central tenet of evolutionary archaeology is the idea
that behavioral variation and innovation are undirected
or independent with respect to selection. As Dunnell
(1980:62) succinctly puts it,
Selection determines which [behaviors] will be transmitted, not which will occur. Behavioral variability,
no less than mutation in strictly biological settings,
does not direct evolution. Selection acting on variation does. If inclusive fitness or any other evolutionary concept would allow us to predict the appear6. This relationship between the strength of selection and the
amount of heritable variation also applies to cultural transmission
systems (see Boyd and Richerson 1985:chap. 6).

ance of individual behaviors, the same notions
should allow us to predict mutations, a patently
absurd notion.
This statement illustrates the reasoning by which this
approach rejects any explanatory paradigm which includes decision making or adaptive response. It is ultimately based on the following logic:
1. Darwinian evolution designs adaptations
through the action of natural selection acting upon
heritable variation.
2. Through cultural transmission, phenotypic variation (including behavior and artifacts) becomes heritable.
3. Undirected variation is an essential aspect of genetic evolution.
4. Therefore, it is essential to cultural evolution
as well.
While we accept 1–3, we hold that 4 is a non sequitur.
The principle of undirected variation is certainly critical to the theory of natural selection, for reasons stated
clearly in the following passage (Rindos 1989a:39):
From the Darwinian perspective, undirected variation is important for its role in fueling the engine of
evolutionary change by generating new forms which
may then be subject to selection. Indeed . . . without a true concept of undirected variation, natural
selection is not only unnecessary but is actually impossible. If variation is less than undirected, then
natural selection cannot be seen as a creative force
in evolution. . . . Only if we see variation as being
produced randomly with respect to selective pressures may we claim that the directionality that may
be observed in evolution over time is the result of
natural selection.
In the genetical theory of evolution by natural selection, the ultimate source of variation is mutation of the
genetic code. This mutation process (along with other
sources of genetic variation, such as recombination) is
generally recognized to be undirected or random. What
exactly does ‘‘undirected’’ or ‘‘random’’ mean here? It
means that the ‘‘chance that a specific mutation will
occur is not affected by how useful that mutation would
be’’ (Futuyma 1986:76), where ‘‘useful’’ refers to effects
on the organism’s survival and reproduction (i.e., fitness
value). For example, the probability that the mutation
that gives rise to the sickle cell trait will occur is completely unaffected by the current prevalence of malaria.
Once the variant exists, the prevalence of malaria acts
as a selective factor determining its frequency in the
population’s gene pool. The production of mutations is
‘‘undirected’’ with respect to current selective advantage, and hence the production of novel variation in genetical evolution is entirely independent of the current
selective advantage of new variants.
The central issue at hand, then, is whether the generation of behavioral variation is independent of selective
pressures (i.e., uncorrelated with adaptive benefit) and
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hence conceptually analogous to mutation. We argue
that it is not. While past selection does not determine
when, where, how, and why a particular mutation will
occur, it does determine to a large extent when, where,
how, and why an organism will express a particular behavior (or other phenotypic state) in response to current
(or even projected) environmental conditions. Although
mutations (with possible rare exceptions) are never statistically directed in fitness-enhancing directions, many
species have evolved capabilities for phenotypic modification that are indeed directed towards fitness enhancement. In the decision-rule paradigm of evolutionary ecology, these take the form ‘‘under condition α do
x, but under condition β do y’’ (where x confers greater
fitness benefit than y under α but less than y under β).
Of course, the directedness of behavioral innovation
is a matter of degree. We expect that behavioral innovation will sometimes be random with respect to fitness
gain, particularly in novel ecological and social settings;
the various problem-solving cognitive mechanisms (rational choice, scenario construction, etc.) are certainly
not omniscient. Even in these cases, however, we expect that genetically evolved learning mechanisms (e.g.,
operant conditioning) will reshape behavior in fitnessenhancing directions within a relatively short time (i.e.,
less than the lifetime of an individual organism); after
all, this fitness payoff is why selection designed these
mechanisms in the first place.7 Obviously, if we are correct about the generally adaptive nature of behavioral
innovation, this will often short-circuit the chance for
natural selection to alter the frequencies of such behavior.
the future is now
In arguing that behavioral or cultural innovations are
‘‘undirected’’ with respect to selective pressures, some
evolutionary archaeologists have in fact expanded the
original concept of undirected or adaptively random
variation to apply to both current and future selective
conditions (i.e., conditions that do not yet exist). For example, Jones, Leonard, and Abbott (1995:18) state that
‘‘innovations arise independently of the processes of selection. While the production of variants is to a degree
constrained by preceding states of the system, the nature of that variation is not determined by the future
course of the system.’’ By ‘‘future course of the system’’
Jones et al. seem to mean future selective pressures, for
in the next few sentences they illustrate their point by
arguing that many technologies have become ‘‘far more
successful in contexts unrelated to ones for which they
were intended originally’’ (p. 18) and that ‘‘neither individuals nor the systems they operated in could foresee
the long string of events leading to’’ the evolution of
agriculture. The summary statement of this paper is
7. The literature on behavioral innovation and learning is of course
vast; for useful reviews of the relation between innovation and
adaptive outcomes, see Boyd and Richerson (1985), Marler and Terrace (1984), and Plotkin (1994).

‘‘Cultural systems provide a wide array of variation generating mechanisms, including rational decision making, but none of these guide evolution over the long
term. That is accomplished by forces of selection and
drift’’ (p. 29, emphasis added). In a similar vein, Dunnell
(1996a:xi) states: ‘‘We see ourselves as solving problems
and therefore rebel at the notion that the generation of
variation is random with respect to selective conditions. Yet there is absolutely no evidence that a Lamarckian engine is at work in our evolution, since we
have no access to future selective conditions.’’ While
adding the (questionable) label ‘‘Lamarckian,’’ the
thrust of this statement is the same as that of Jones et
al.: human innovation is adaptively random because it
does not anticipate future selective conditions.8 Clearly,
focusing on the ‘‘unguided’’ nature of cultural variation
over ‘‘the long term’’ is a radical expansion of the original axiom of the genetic theory of evolution that mutation is adaptively random with respect to current selective conditions.
While we certainly agree that neither behavioral variants nor mutations can be determined or caused by future selection or anything else that has not yet occurred—cause must precede effect in any coherent
causal account—this is not a logical criticism of adaptationist or intentionalist accounts of cultural innovation. The evolutionary archaeological argument follows
superficially from the fact that the genetical theory of
evolution by natural selection involves a two-step process: ‘‘1) the production of undirected variation and
2) the sorting of these traits by means of differential success of the variant forms over time’’ (Rindos 1989b:8).
We have argued above that what is true of genetic variation is not necessarily true of cultural or behavioral
variation, but in any case the argument we are exploring
here is distinct in that it extends the axiom of undirected variation to refer to future selective pressures.
Why would this extension be made? Although this is
never fully spelled out, our best inference from the evolutionary archaeological literature and conversations
with several key proponents is that it serves to protect
their belief that behavioral innovation is analogous to
(undirected) mutation against attack on the grounds
that humans obviously do engage in directed phenotypic (behavioral, technological, and cultural) innovation. Thus, the counterargument goes, even when such
innovations are consciously directed towards solving
current adaptive problems, since no one can foresee future environmental states or other changes in selective
pressures in the long run, behavioral variation is effectively undirected.
Our interpretation is supported by Neff’s (1992:146)
claim that ‘‘to direct evolution through innovation, humans would have to solve future problems and exploit
future opportunities, and would have to anticipate the
impact of particular solutions on conditions in the more
8. We term the ‘‘Lamarckian’’ label questionable because Lamarckian evolution posits that variation is responsive to present selective
forces, not future ones.
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long-term future.’’ This argument strikes us as faulty in
that it confuses the claim (of evolutionary ecology, for
example) that phenotypic innovation is often effectively directed at solving existing adaptive problems
and opportunities with the much stronger claim that it
is successful in anticipating changed adaptive conditions in the future. In doing so, this argument holds
phenotypic adaptation to a higher standard than natural
selection itself; to see this one can simply reword the
statement by substituting ‘‘adaptation’’ for ‘‘innovation’’ and ‘‘natural selection’’ for ‘‘humans.’’ 9
Having argued that innovation would have to be omniscient in order to be a significant adaptive force, many
evolutionary archaeologists conclude that most or all
directional change in human history must be due to selection. A particularly strong version of this view is that
‘‘all change is the result of selection acting upon the undirected variant cultural forms existing at earlier points
in time’’ (Rindos 1989a:28). This logic is exemplified in
some evolutionary archaeological discussions of domestication, where the admission that people may engage
in incipient domestication in order to increase their
food supply or reduce risk is countered by arguing that
in the long run this innovation will lead to resource specialization, population growth, and hence increased resource variability and nutritional risk. Such unintended
long-term consequences are then used to blunt the
adaptive relevance of decisions and behavioral innovations.
A striking example of this kind of argument occurs in
Rindos’s (1989a:33, emphasis added) discussion of the
effect of maize production in the prehistoric American
Southeast:
The most obvious way to deal with the interacting
factors of increasing population, increasing potential
yield, and increased variance in that yield would be
an attempt to buffer the system by increased association and trade within and between regions. Then, if
a crop is bad in one locality, maize could be imported from other localities during the crisis period.
This is a type of activity that requires no foresight,
merely a response to a specific condition of immediate reduced food availability. Furthermore, over
time such arrangements could grow and have consequences that were totally unforeseeable at the moment that the exchange systems were initially established.
9. Neff (1992:146) in fact states the analogy to be that ‘‘DNA molecules know nothing of future evolutionary needs or opportunities.
The same observation applies to humans who introduce innovations to solve perceived problems or exploit perceived opportunities.’’ But the analogy is faulty on two grounds. First, DNA molecules can never ‘‘know’’ anything, and neither can natural
selection, whereas humans do have the cognitive capability to
model future states of the world and the impact of those states on
their survival or other fitness correlates with some degree of accuracy. Second, as we are arguing here, the axiom of undirected variation in Darwinian theory applies to the present adaptive value of
variation, not any future adaptive value.

Although we are skeptical that trade systems (particularly the ritualized forms that occur between sovereign
polities like the Southeastern chiefdoms) ‘‘require no
foresight,’’ we have no objection to the rest of Rindos’s
statement. But we do not see how these factors weaken
explanations based (in part) on adaptive decisions.
While we grant that adaptive change often has many
unforeseen consequences, we wonder why this is any
more effective in emasculating the causal role of cultural innovation or behavioral adaptation than the same
argument applied to natural selection. Surely ‘‘over
time’’ the selective pressures favoring any trait (such as
domestication) will change as ecological and demographic factors alter. In the same way, if behavioral
responses to current adaptive problems ultimately alter the adaptive landscape (e.g., through population
growth), new responses to the changed conditions can
be expected to arise. Only if the rate of environmental
change exceeds the capability for phenotypic adaptation
or the changes are too subtle to be detected must we
assume that innovation is nonadaptive.
A related critique of the evolutionary archaeological
position concerns its failure to recognize that humans
have highly developed and evolutionarily specialized
cognitive mechanisms for projecting past experience
into the future and formulating behaviors that ‘‘anticipate’’ future environmental contingencies (Tooby and
DeVore 1987; Byrne and Whiten 1988). This does not
mean that our explanations of such decision-making behaviors locate the cause of the behavior in its actual future results, nor does it mean that strategic or decisionmaking models place their explanatory emphasis on
‘‘intended effects.’’ According to evolutionary ecology,
the causes of a behavioral strategy are to be located in
the interaction between an organism’s evolved and
learned cognitive and problem-solving capabilities and
its current environmental conditions. Hence, cause precedes behavioral effect, and a deterministic, evolutionary theory of behavioral variation is possible.
According to evolutionary archaeology, because people cannot foresee future selective conditions or unintended consequences of their actions, natural selection
ultimately determines cultural evolution, regardless of
the short-term strategic adjustments people may consciously or unconsciously make to present conditions.
Thus, since organisms cannot foresee the changed selective conditions of the future, their phenotypic responses are adaptively impotent and serve only as grist
for selection’s mill; all explanatory weight is carried by
selection. Clearly this approach and evolutionary ecology have rather different views of the relation between
ecological and evolutionary time scales. Since evolutionary ecology assumes that selection has designed organisms to be able to solve most adaptive problems,
hypotheses guided by this assumption predict that people (and many other organisms) will be quite capable of
responding to changed selective conditions with new
adaptive strategies. Granted, a solution to one adaptive
problem may lead to the emergence of new problems,
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but this is just as true in the realm of natural selection
as in that of behavioral problem solving. In the evolutionary ecological view, the process is a recursive one
whose causal structure can be diagrammed thus:
current environmental conditions → phenotypic adaptation
↑
↓
new phenotypic adaptation ← new environmental conditions

There is no finality or teleology to this view, just as
there is none if one substitutes ‘‘evolutionary adaptation via natural selection’’ for ‘‘phenotypic adaptation.’’
Of course, all behavioral strategies played out in the
present have some effect on future environmental
states. For example, in the case of diet-breadth expansion discussed above, the successful foraging strategies
of early Archaic hunters may have caused a reduction
in the abundance of large terrestrial mammals, to which
later Archaic foragers had to adjust. Such effects, commonly termed ‘‘unintended consequences’’ (i.e., effects
other than those sought by the decision-making organism), may constitute ‘‘unselected consequences’’ as
well—that is, effects that alter the selective pressures
impinging on the behavioral strategies being analyzed.
Explaining unintended or unselected consequences, it
seems to us, is primarily a historical problem, not an
evolutionary one. By this we mean that not all change
with observable material consequences (such as might
show up in the archaeological record) is evolutionary
change—descent with modification caused by evolutionary mechanisms such as natural selection or drift.
We suspect that much of the reason some evolutionary archaeological theorists emphasize ‘‘future’’ selective conditions as an ultimate cause of change is their
desire to make evolutionary theory a theory of unintended consequences—that is, a science of history (see
Dunnell 1982). Rindos (1989a:38–39) provides one clear
statement of this view:
Viewing variation as undirected brings about a
change in the way in which we set about attempting to explain cultural evolution. Here, the
spread of behaviour throughout a society, or . . .
throughout the species, is the result of the fitness
induced by that behaviour. . . . Rather than seeing
change as a consequence of the adoption of a particular form of behaviour, emphasis is placed upon the
historical consequences of a particular variant form
of behaviour for the humans exhibiting that behaviour.
Our main objection to this is simple. Unintended and
unselected consequences take the form of environmental effects as well as genetic and phenotypic ones. Some
environmental effects are caused by human agency,
while others, such as exogenous climate change, are
not. With respect to phenotypic changes that result, the
distinction is not important, since humans must adjust
to these new conditions either way. What is important
is that the environment itself is not ‘‘heritable’’ (a repli-

cator) in any Darwinian sense.10 Hence, environmental
change, whether exogenous or anthropogenic, is not an
evolutionary process. We argue that human history can
certainly be explained, at least in part, in terms of evolutionary processes, but evolutionary change and historical change are not the same thing.
intentions and causes
A third way in which the ‘‘selectionism’’ of evolutionary archaeology and the ‘‘adaptationism’’ of evolutionary ecology may seem to diverge concerns the causal
role of intentionality. Whereas evolutionary ecological
theory and analysis often refer to ‘‘decisions’’ and
‘‘strategies’’ and ‘‘goals,’’ a key programmatic element
of evolutionary archaeology is denial of the explanatory
relevance of goals or intentions for evolutionary analysis. For example, O’Brien and Holland (1990:44) contend
that
in one sense we can speak, rather trivially, of intent
being a proximate cause of something, but of what
analytical value is such a statement? Proximate
causes, in any scientific framework, are functional
causes, i.e. how things work. To invoke intent as an
explanation robs valid functional questions of their
interesting parts and replaces them with vitalistic,
directional components.
Similarly, Dunnell (1989:37) writes, ‘‘If human intentions cause human history and diversity, then do we
suppose that squirrel history and diversity, or oak tree
history and diversity, or star history and diversity are
the consequences of squirrel intentions, or oak tree intentions, or star intentions? Generally not. These phenomena are understood without recourse to vitalism.’’
We expect most behavioral ecologists to be in general
agreement with both of these statements. Let us be
careful, however, not to throw the baby out with the
bathwater. Behavioral ecologists do not view behavioral
variants, ‘‘strategies,’’ or ‘‘decisions’’ as isomorphic
with ‘‘intentions.’’ It is quite possible to talk about an
oak species’s strategy for seed dispersal without assuming that trees have actual ‘‘intentions’’ in dispersing
seeds. In general, evolutionary ecology employs such
strategic language as a convenient shorthand, analyzing
adaptive design such as seed dispersal as if a plant had
dispersal intentions without assuming that it in fact
does. In the case of organisms that do seem to have intentions (such as humans), these are viewed as proximate causes in the manner suggested by O’Brien and
Holland. Ultimately, such intentions are explained as
10. In the case of coevolution between two or more populations (as
in predator-prey systems) or social interactions with fitness consequences within a population (as in mating systems or intraspecific
resource competition), the relevant aspect of the environment for
any player does contain replicators and hence is subject to evolutionary change. For that reason, evolutionary ecologists have
adopted special techniques such as evolutionarily-stable-strategy
theory (e.g., Maynard Smith 1982) for analyzing such dynamics.
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products of past (genetic or cultural) evolution; as Daly
and Wilson aptly put it, ‘‘natural selection has no goals,
but it is the reason why organisms do’’ (1991:219).
But—and here is the nub of the dispute between the
two approaches—to the extent that intentions contribute to phenotypic adaptation, they produce adaptive
changes without concurrent selection.
Many evolutionary archaeological theorists seem to
recognize only two possibilities: either intentions explain everything (the alleged conventional wisdom
which they criticize) or they play only the minor supporting role of generating undirected variation. Thus,
we are told that ‘‘for whatever reason, anthropologists
are incapable of shrugging free of intention as the ultimate explanatory device (see Ramenofsky 1995). Intention, however, explains nothing but how variation
might be generated’’ (O’Brien and Holland 1995:180).
Having reduced intentionality to a black box that generates variation, O’Brien and Holland go on to undercut
even this role: ‘‘This is not to say that intentions explain the generation of variation, only that, like a host
of other agents, they can spawn variation.’’
What such pronouncements overlook is the critical
difference between positing intentions as the root cause
of some phenomenon and positing them (or their functional equivalent, such as the decision rules of evolutionary ecology or the cognitive algorithms of evolutionary psychology) as intermediate links within a
causal pathway. Evolutionary archaeology rejects the
first position, and because it fails even to recognize the
second it considers the matter concluded. In contrast,
while sharing its rejection of intentions as root causes,
we hold that evolutionary explanations of human history and behavioral change generally need to include intentions or their equivalent in the causal pathway because these often provide the link between natural
selection and behavioral regularities. That is, past genetic (and perhaps cultural) evolution has shaped the
human psyche to be very effective at solving adaptive
problems, and one important element of the psyche is
what we commonly label ‘‘intentions’’ or ‘‘goals’’ or
‘‘preferences.’’
We have pointed to both commonalities and differences between evolutionary ecology and evolutionary
archaeology. In contrast with evolutionary archaeology,
evolutionary ecology posits that humans have remarkable capabilities to adapt their phenotypes to their environments through learning and rational calculation.
The two approaches agree that we have the evolved capacity for the cultural transmission of the phenotypes
so acquired to the next generation. Taken together, this
adaptive dynamic resembles a Lamarckian process
more than a strictly Darwinian one (Boyd and Richerson 1985, Gould 1979). Does this mean that we are suggesting that evolution is ‘‘directed’’ by human strategic
responses to the environment, as Dunnell (quoted
above) implies? Not at all. As we have argued above,
phenotypic adaptation in response to environmental
conditions does not cause change, it is change.

Begging the Meaningless Question:
How Do We Explain Change?
What can the evolutionary archaeological paradigm
gain by viewing behavior as strategic problem solving?
We would answer: a great deal of explanatory power
that it currently lacks. Rindos (1984) eloquently charts
the evolutionary effects of plant domestication but
when considering why humans adopted domesticates in
the first place concludes that this is a ‘‘question without meaning’’ (p. 141). In the genetical theory of evolution by natural selection, it may well be meaningless to
ask why, say, the sickle cell trait arose in the first place,
because the mutation which produced it presumably
occurred independently of its benefit to its heterozygous carrier (i.e., mutation is random with respect to
adaptive value). Selection determines only the degree to
which it would spread or persist in populations with a
high incidence of malaria. It is, however, not meaningless to ask why, for example, a forager faced with a series of options might decide to invest more time or energy in the propagation of plant foods. The distinction
turns once again on the issue of undirected variation.
Given what we know about mutations, the prediction
that hemoglobin mutations are more likely to occur in
areas where malaria is endemic is sure to be incorrect,
but the prediction that foraging populations characterized by sedentary settlement and resource intensification are more likely to innovate by adopting cultigens
is plausible.
Other applications of evolutionary archaeology exhibit the same pattern of question-begging exemplified
by Rindos. Variation is noted—people were planting a
variety of crops, people were specializing or generalizing (Leonard 1989), people were living in larger and
smaller settlements, some people were organizing
themselves into collective labor forces (Leonard and
Reid 1993)—but in each case the behavioral variation
just happens to occur. The only opportunity for explanation that remains is to make up plausible post hoc
stories about why a given variant was selected for or
against. This procedure seems just as susceptible to the
charges of circularity and storytelling that are leveled
at many ‘‘adaptationist’’ explanations. Furthermore, the
post hoc nature of the selectionist explanation (i.e., the
evolutionary archaeological account of why the trait
was selected for or against) virtually guarantees that it
cannot be tested: it ultimately takes the form ‘‘Suchand-such was selected for because it was adaptive, and
this is why.’’
The prevalence of selectionist ‘‘just-so’’ stories in the
evolutionary archaeological literature has recently been
recognized by at least some of its proponents, and
we cannot improve upon the following self-critique
(O’Brien and Holland 1995:188):
These ‘‘just-so’’ stories are neat little explanations
tethered loosely to evolutionary principles by the
unguarded use of the word ‘‘selection.’’ Measurable
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variation too often becomes prima facie evidence for
a groundless cause-and-effect relation between an artifact and some nebulous concept of fitness and adaptation. The terms ‘‘selection,’’ ‘‘selective forces,’’
and ‘‘selective agents’’ become a ready means of understanding patterns that emerge from our analysis
of data for which we have no other ready explanation.
In contrast, the evolutionary ecological research
strategy is hypothetico-deductive, using explanatory
models to develop testable predictions and then looking
for evidence that bears on these predictions (Smith and
Winterhalder 1992b). Why were people planting things
rather than continuing to rely on wild foods? Why did
they do it where they did, when they did? Why were
they generalizing or specializing? Why did large settlements occur in some places and not others? Why did
people organize themselves into large labor forces in
some places and not others? The logical structure of
evolutionary ecology seems to us to be uniquely suited
to answering these kinds of questions. Once we accept
that behavioral innovation is not adaptively random,
optimization models can be used to produce hypotheses
regarding which environmental factors are eliciting the
variation. And since these hypotheses typically incorporate specific ideas about the currency, constraints, and
relevant environmental variables, they can be tested
empirically.11 Structuring the problem in this manner
allows one to suggest an answer to the ‘‘meaningless’’
question posed by Rindos.
Rindos (1980, 1984, 1989a) has been the primary evolutionary archaeological contributor to the literature on
domestication. As he portrays it, domestication will occur whenever certain ecological circumstances apply.
Specifically, when a foraging population modifies the
environment so as to (unintentionally) enhance the dispersal, survival, or pollination of a plant population,
this modification will increase the food supply of the
foragers and hence favor their behavioral patterns via
natural selection (of cultural variation). Domestication
ensues when plant varieties that are genetically more
susceptible to human propagation and harvest are favored through human-mediated natural selection. But,
as Rindos notes, given the symbiotic and coevolutionary nature of this scenario, we could just as well say
that plants domesticate humans as the opposite.
In outline, Rindos’s analysis consists of four tenets:
(1) domestication is fundamentally a coevolutionary
process that alters the traits of both domesticators and
11. In optimization theory, ‘‘currency’’ refers to the variable that
is maximized by the optimal solution. In evolutionary ecology, currencies, such as resource capture rate or predator detection rate, are
usually proxies for fitness, chosen because they are more readily
measurable than fitness itself. (For general discussions of optimality modeling from this standpoint, see Krebs and Davies 1991,
Maynard Smith 1978, Parker and Maynard Smith 1990, and Stephens and Krebs 1986; for applications to human behavior, see
Smith 1987, Smith and Winterhalder 1992b, and various authors
in Smith and Winterhalder 1992a.)

domesticates; (2) the process is unintentional and results from natural selection acting on adaptively random variation in human behavior (culturally inherited)
and domesticate morphology/physiology (genetically
inherited); (3) the result is generally symbiotic (enhancing the fitness of both parties) though not necessarily
stable; (4) domestication eventually leads to large increases in human population density. Of these, only 2
is either controversial or truly novel; it is also the element that places Rindos’s account squarely within the
evolutionary archaeological framework. In any case,
Rindos is at pains to differentiate his scenario from
more conventional ones in which humans intentionally
favor more productive plant varieties or engage in selective breeding. As he puts it (1989a:34), ‘‘cultural processes such as innovation or discovery are processes
that permit, but do not directly cause, cultural change.
In the case [of domestication], the true reason for cultural change may be detected only in the social and demographic consequences of agriculturally induced
changes in environment and behaviour.’’ For purposes
of this paper, then, it is critical to consider Rindos’s
claim—so characteristic of evolutionary archaeology—
that a ‘‘true’’ or valid explanation of domestication cannot assign a causal role to behavioral innovation or
problem solving.
While a number of writers have discussed domestication from an evolutionary ecological perspective (e.g.,
Layton, Foley, and Williams 1991, Hawkes and O’Connell 1992, Kaplan and Hill 1992, Redding 1988), the fullest account is by Winterhalder and Goland (1993 and
esp. 1997). As they put it, the ‘‘microecological’’ perspective of optimal foraging theory can be used to explain how low-ranked plant resources could have entered the diet of hunter-gatherers, initiating the
coevolutionary relationships which created domesticates (Winterhalder and Goland 1997:32).
The Winterhalder-Goland analysis relies primarily on
the prey-choice model discussed above. In this model,
prey (including protodomesticates) are ranked by their
postencounter profitability, which is independent of
their abundance or encounter rate.12 Four categories of
protodomesticates are thus possible: profitable/abundant, profitable/scarce, unprofitable/abundant, and
unprofitable/scarce. While Winterhalder and Goland
discuss scenarios involving each of these four possible
starting points, for brevity we will note only one, the
case of a protodomesticate that is unprofitable (lowranked) but very abundant. As Winterhalder and Goland
note, the prey-choice model predicts that such a resource will be ignored as long as higher-ranked prey are
12. ‘‘Profitability’’ here means expected net return (e.g., in calories)
per unit handling time, where ‘‘handling’’ is defined as pursuit, capture, and processing (i.e., any actions required to consume a resource once it is encountered). Profitability is independent of encounter rate whenever items are handled singly or in any other way
that does not create an economy of scale. For a detailed discussion
of these points, see Stephens and Krebs (1986:chaps. 2 and 3) or
Smith (1991:204–9).
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sufficiently abundant, but if such prey decline in abundance (because of localized depletion, climate or habitat
change, human population growth, or any other reason),
the protodomesticate will be incorporated into the diet.
Since in this case the protodomesticate is very abundant, the initial result will be a major infusion of food
energy into the population and a broadening of the diet
(as all higher-ranked resources will continue to be taken
whenever encountered). The longer-term result will
be massive ecological change, as human population
growth fueled by the protodomesticate produces depletion of many wild resources; there will also be narrowing of the diet as the protodomesticate becomes
ever more profitable and abundant by undergoing the
coevolutionary modifications proposed by Rindos.
In their conclusions, Winterhalder and Goland discuss other approaches, including that of Rindos, and in
fact show how an evolutionary ecological analysis can
be articulated with the evolutionary archaeological emphasis on unintended long-term consequences. Foraging
theory can be used to illuminate the role of various ecological circumstances in eliciting phenotypic responses
(behavioral innovations) that enhance forager fitness
and have unintended but profound consequences for human population ecology. In providing the middle-range
theory needed to connect selective pressures with behavioral responses, ‘‘foraging theory can supply hypotheses on questions the Rindos model neglects: What circumstances led humans to select certain species for
exploitation? What are the economic and population
processes that accompany growing dependence on domesticates and cultivation?’’ (Winterhalder and Goland
1997:127). This case suggests that the two approaches
can be complementary rather than competitive, but this
complementarity requires an acknowledgment that decisions and actions are fundamental to human (phenotypic) adaptation, not simply generators of adaptively
random variation on which natural selection will then
act.13

What We See and What We Know:
Can Archaeologists Study Behavior?
In addition to the theoretical issues discussed above,
there is a more immediate and empirically based issue
that leads evolutionary archaeologists to reject a focus
on the analysis of behavior in archaeology. This is the
view that archaeology should focus on changing artifact
frequencies through time because these are the only
phenomena that are empirically observable in the ar13. Signs of a move towards rapprochement with (or co-optation
of?) evolutionary ecology can be seen in recent suggestions that optimization analysis can play a valid role in evolutionary analysis.
For example, Jones, Leonard, and Abbott (1995:27) refer to engineering criteria and adaptive optimization as ‘‘powerful tools in understanding the selective processes acting through ecologic relations that govern technologic change’’ (see also Graves and
Ladefoged 1995; Maxwell 1995; O’Brien and Holland 1995:190).
Tellingly, though, only Graves and Ladefoged cite any of the abundant evolutionary ecological literature on optimization analysis.

chaeological record. Since behavior is not empirically
observable in the archaeological record, the argument
goes, we cannot study it there (e.g., Dunnell 1980:88;
1989:43). Taken at face value, this sounds like a form
of radical empiricism, the tenet that science can only
consider directly observable phenomena.14 Radical empiricism was once prevalent in a variety of sciences but
has been widely abandoned. Indeed, such a restriction
would eliminate much of nuclear physics, return psychology to 1950s-era behaviorism, cripple historical geology, and strip evolutionary paleontology to its (fossilized) bones.15
It is characteristic of such radical empiricism that it
is more readily advanced as a doctrine than adhered to
in practice; archaeology is no exception. Perusal of the
evolutionary archaeological literature reveals that virtually the only cases in which changing artifact frequencies per se actually provide the empirical focus are
studies of stylistic variation (Neiman 1995)—which
evolutionary archaeologists have typically seen as resulting from drift, not selection. In any case, evolutionary archaeologists are clearly interested in larger issues
as well. These include the origins of domestication,
population aggregation and dispersal, collective labor,
and the origins of complex societies.
All of these topics involve whole suites of variable behaviors with which artifacts are only indirectly associated. We do not empirically observe domestication being carried out in the archaeological record; rather, we
observe artifacts and ecofacts that we infer to be associated with domestication behavior. We do not observe
people aggregating or dispersing in the archaeological
record, nor do we observe small independent social
groups coalescing into larger sociopolitical units. The
archaeological record does not reveal humans exchanging goods or engaging in mobility or sedentism. What
we see are archaeological correlates—material entailments—of these various behaviors. Dunnell’s call
for archaeologists to abandon behavioral reconstruction
(1989:45) has become a clarion call in evolutionary archaeology; yet as soon as we utter words like ‘‘settlement pattern’’ we have already engaged in behavioral
reconstruction. Hence, Dunnell’s advice strikes us as
almost impossible to follow in practice. In our view, the
question of whether or not we can empirically study or
14. This radical empiricism seems to have played a role in narrowing the way some selectionists view evolution, as seen in their
definition of evolution as consisting of the differential persistence
of variation (e.g., Dunnell 1980:38; Jones, Leonard, and Abbott
1995:14; Ramenofsky 1995:135; Teltser 1995a:4, 5). While such differential persistence is certainly fundamental to evolution, the explanatory power of Darwinian theory comes from its success in accounting for the adaptive design of phenotypes and the creation of
new designs. After all, Darwin made adaptive design and divergence his central object of explanation and entitled his magnum
opus The Origin of Species (not The Differential Persistence of
Variants).
15. For a recent critical review of philosophical issues concerning
‘‘observables’’ in scientific explanation, explicating how and why
unobservable phenomena are necessary and proper elements of scientific investigation, see Kitcher (1993).
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infer behavior in the archaeological record is entirely
one of degree and hence of considerably less metaphysical importance than some evolutionary archaeological
theorists (e.g., Dunnell 1989:43) would have us believe.
There is another strand to the rejection of behavioral
reconstruction that turns on matters of explanatory
logic rather than empirical sufficiency. This concerns
the idea that behavior has no lawfulness other than that
externally imposed by selection. While we share evolutionary archaeology’s skepticism concerning the inductive epistemological strategy of ‘‘behavioral archaeology’’ (sensu Schiffer 1976), we share the latter’s view
that behavioral reconstruction of some sort is essential
to an understanding of large parts of the archaeological
record. In particular, we reject the view that the absence
of behavior per se from the archaeological record makes
behavior an inappropriate object of archaeological explanation. We also reject the non sequitur that since behavior varies we cannot use it to explain the past, as in
the following passage: ‘‘There is no deterministic relation between the behavioral terms of reconstruction
and the debris of the archaeological record. Such a relation would have to be founded in laws, and behavioral
laws, as just noted, cannot exist because behavior
changes. Without a deterministic relation between the
two, behavioral explanations are untestable in the archaeological record’’ (Dunnell 1992:216). That behavior
‘‘changes’’ does not make behavioral explanations ‘‘untestable’’ any more than changes in selective forces
make selectionist explanations untestable. Indeed, from
the evolutionary ecological perspective (as well as most
of behavioral biology and social science), the regularities (‘‘deterministic relation’’) between behavior and the
archaeological record in fact derive from behavioral
change that responds to variation in social and natural
environments.
Furthermore, one does not have to adopt a ‘‘law and
order’’ (Flannery 1973) view of behavior in order to posit
regularities between behavior and the archaeological
record. In fact, the evolutionary archaeological framework only makes sense if there are regularities between
environmental factors and archaeological change, regularities which work via selection, drift, and other evolutionary mechanisms. Evolutionary ecology adds the assumption that regularities also are instantiated via
phenotypic adaptation, including behavioral and technological responses. It also posits that many behavioral
regularities (decision rules) are predictable because
these have been designed by past natural selection.
As we argued above with respect to ‘‘intentions,’’ one
does not have to view behavioral factors as root causes
of historical change to consider them important parts of
historical (including archaeological) explanation. While
we recognize that ‘‘because the archaeological record
does not provide any direct observational access to human behavior, the methods used in an evolutionary archaeology will look very different than, for example, an
evolutionary ethnography’’ (Teltser 1995a:3), we insist
that evolutionary explanations of the archaeological
record must implicitly or explicitly trace causality

through behavior. For one thing, geological or climatic
factors shaping taphonomic processes cannot themselves evolve in any Darwinian sense. Teltser’s suggestion that evolutionary archaeology must develop new
theory to deal with behavior because evolutionary biology ‘‘does not include the necessary terms to address behavioral phenomena’’ (1995a:3) would be true only if
one ignored the explosion of theory and data developed
in evolutionary behavioral ecology over the past three
decades (e.g., Alcock 1993, Krebs and Davies 1997). Unfortunately, evolutionary archaeology seems generally
to have done just that. As a result, it is just as vulnerable to the charge of parochialism and misinterpretation
of Darwinism as it has shown midcentury cultural evolutionism to be (Dunnell 1980, Leonard and Jones 1987).
Ironically, the proposal to operationalize evolutionary analysis strictly in terms of archaeologically observed phenomena brings its own intractable problems
to the evolutionary archaeological program. This is particularly clear in the way selectionists have attempted
to operationalize the concept of selection in the analysis of archaeological change. Since selection is inarguably a dynamic process while the archaeological record
is essentially static (Binford 1983:19–20), we cannot actually observe selection occurring in the record any
more than we can observe behaviors. In a very influential article on patterns of artifact frequency change,
Dunnell (1978) attempted to solve this problem by arguing that any sustained directional change in the frequency of an artifact type is a sign of selection at work.16
But what might be true for genetic evolution and on
palaeontological time scales seems to us far more problematic in an archaeological or historical context. The
well-documented secular trends of increased stature
and earlier age at menarche (Eveleth and Tanner 1990,
Wood 1994), for instance, while quite directional and
sustained (having continued for centuries in some populations) and of considerable magnitude (e.g., up to 30%
reduction in menarcheal age in some populations),
clearly result not from selection or any other form of
evolutionary change but from phenotypic programs that
respond to varying nutritional input with varying
growth and maturation rates. A more archaeological example of the same process is the case of change in the
character of the osteological remains in some stratified
sequence, the early occupants of a site or region having
very robust skeletal structure while later occupants are
more gracile. Barring migration, this could be due to
evolution in robusticity (e.g., due to declining selection
pressure for channeling energy to bone growth or even
to drift in a small population) or to phenotypic adjustments (maturing bones subject to less stress develop
less robustly). The former change is evolutionary, while
the latter is not. Or skeletal remains might show a diachronic increase in signs of nutritional stress (e.g., Har16. Dunnell’s argument has become a fundamental axiom in the
evolutionary archaeological literature; see, for example, Jones,
Leonard, and Abbott (1995), Neiman (1995), O’Brien and Holland
(1990, 1992, 1995), among others.
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ris lines); this again is phenotypic rather than evolutionary change. By positing natural selection as the only
source of sustained directional change, evolutionary archaeological theorists have become prisoners of their
limited explanatory framework.

Conclusion
Virtually all animals and plants have evolved at least
some capacity to adjust phenotypically to varying environmental conditions. Therefore many environmental
changes will produce a change in the observed mean
phenotype of a population without any selection or evolutionary change. Put another way, variable phenotypic
adjustment by individuals in a population to changing
environmental conditions does not just constitute
‘‘variation’’ as raw material for selection; it constitutes
a form of nonrandom, directional adaptive change in
and of itself. In humans, the capacity for problem solving and for adapting phenotypically to a wide range of
environmental conditions is highly developed (and a
product of our evolutionary history). The material entailments of these processes produce an observable archaeological record of adaptive change. We have argued
that explanation of this kind of adaptive change requires a specific kind of evolutionary logic. A central
goal of this paper has been to outline this logic, show
how it differs from the evolutionary archaeological use
of the concept of selection, and suggest that adopting
it can produce more powerful explanations of adaptive
change in the archaeological record.
Evolutionary archaeologists do not generally deny
that behavior may involve problem solving or that behavioral variation may occur as much by design as by
chance (e.g., Rindos 1989b:13–15; O’Brien and Holland
1990:44–45). They do, however, consistently deny that
the problem-solving nature of behavior has any role to
play in the explanation of phenotypic change over time.
Again, this seemingly contradictory view stems from
their insistence on adopting a strict genetic analogy,
with the two-step (unguided variation, selection) process of evolutionary change it entails. In contrast, evolutionary ecologists argue that behavioral variation (including innovation) is at least partially guided by
perceived costs and benefits linked to environmental
variation.
We expect that all parties can agree that variation in
artifact frequencies and spatial patterning through time
and across space must ultimately be produced by behavioral variation (in conjunction with taphonomic and
other nonbehavioral factors). Yet directional and adaptive behavioral change need not be directly the result of
evolutionary processes such as natural selection or
drift. Instead, it may be due in large part to facultative
phenotypic response to varying environmental conditions. However, even in this case natural selection ultimately helps to explain behavioral variation, since the
capacity to respond behaviorally and, indeed, very often
adaptively is an evolved capacity. This is the fundamental tenet of evolutionary ecology.

Natural selection (and other evolutionary forces) may
shape behavioral variation in another way, through a
distinct process of cultural evolution. The degree of independence of cultural evolution from genetic evolution is as yet unresolved (e.g., Boyd and Richerson 1985,
Durham 1991, Flinn 1997, Rindos 1985). Whether or
not one accepts a distinct and autonomous role for cultural evolution, there is no need to banish behavior and
decision making from the explanatory framework of
evolutionary archaeology.
While the theory of natural selection provides a powerful explanatory mechanism, it becomes even more
powerful when linked with other concepts, including
some from the social sciences. Indeed, the rich developments in contemporary evolutionary theory (e.g., Maynard Smith 1982, Krebs and Davies 1997) would not
have been possible without extensive borrowing from
decision theory and economics. Those wishing to analyze human society, behavior, and technological change
using evolutionary theory would be far better off emulating this judicious borrowing and adaptation of social
science concepts (cf. various authors in Smith and Winterhalder 1992a) than heeding evolutionary archaeology’s dismissal of any elements of social science and decision theory as metaphysically tainted.
For archaeology, one of the major implications of the
distinction between evolutionary ecology and the evolutionary archaeology program critiqued here concerns
the relation between archaeological evidence—temporally and spatially varying occurrences of artifacts, ecofacts, features, and sites—and processes of evolutionary
change. The evolutionary archaeologists see temporal
variation in the frequencies of these archaeological entities as evolutionary change per se. This view is exemplified in Dunnell’s (1978) argument that directional
changes in artifact frequencies signal selection at work
while stochastic changes reflect the evolutionary process of drift. It appears that one of the main attractions
of this line of reasoning is the extremely (and in our
view overly) simple and direct link that is implied
between archaeological data and the powerful, wellestablished (in biology) theory of evolution by natural
selection.
In contrast, we hold that while the application of evolutionary theory to archaeology can lead to important
gains in explanatory power, it offers no quick fixes. As
a subset of modern evolutionary theory, evolutionary
ecology is a rich source of ideas, but it is a theory about
behavior, not about the archaeological record per se.
Hence, we foresee a continuing, active program of research and analysis dealing with the relationship between past behavior and the formation of the archaeological record in the tradition of Binford’s (1992)
‘‘middle-range theory,’’ Schiffer’s (1976, 1987) ‘‘behavioral archaeology,’’ and ethnoarchaeology as defined by
O’Connell (1995). What has been conspicuously lacking
from this research is a powerful and coherent theory of
behavior that can underlie and unify middle-range theory. We agree with O’Connell (1995) that evolutionary
ecology could remedy this need.
Evolutionary archaeology’s claim that archaeologists
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can explain the archaeological record by applying natural selection theory directly to observable features of
this record is based on several misconstruals of evolutionary biology and cultural evolution. As discussed
above, attempts to apply evolutionary explanations directly to artifact frequencies or other observable aspects
of the archaeological record typically ignore the phenotype-replicator relation and the distinct mechanisms
and complexities pertaining to cultural transmission.
The evolutionary archaeological research program appears to be driven more by an empiricist metaphysic—
now widely abandoned as unworkable and unnecessary
in other sciences—than by the logical entailments of
Darwinian evolution. Virtually ignored by the proponents of this approach, the evolutionary ecological
framework is increasingly being employed to explain
phenotypic variation in both ethnographic and archaeological contexts. We feel confident in concluding that
not only is it possible to study behavior and ecological
adaptation in the archaeological record but indeed we
must do so if we expect to make evolutionary sense
of it.

Comments
d an i e l d e n n e t t
Center for Cognitive Studies, Tufts University,
Medford, Mass. 02155, U.S.A. 22 vii 97
This essay brings into sharp relief a ubiquitous confusion that has dogged discussions of cultural evolution,
one deriving, I suspect, from a subtle misreading of Darwin’s original use of artificial selection (deliberate animal breeding) and ‘‘unconscious’’ selection (the unwitting promotion of favored offspring of domesticated
animals) as bridges to his concept of natural selection.
While it is true that Darwin wished to contrast the utter
lack of foresight or intention in natural selection with
the deliberate goal seeking of the artificial selectors in
order to show how the natural process could in principle proceed without any mentality at all, he did not
thereby establish (as many seem to have supposed) that
deliberate, goal-directed, intentional selection is not a
subvariety of natural selection. The short legs of dachshunds and the huge udders of Holsteins are just as much
products of natural selection as the wings of the eagle;
they simply evolved in an environment that included a
particularly well-focused selective pressure consisting
of human agents. These phenotypes fall under the same
laws of transmission genetics, the same replicator dynamics, as any others—as special and extreme cases in
which the default ‘‘randomness’’ or noisiness of selective pressure has been greatly reduced.
Applied to cultural evolution, the implication is this:
There is no conflict between the claim that artifacts (including abstract artifacts—memes) are the products of
natural selection and the claim that they are (often) the
(foreseen) products of intentional human activity. I

have no direct acquaintance with the works of evolutionary archaeology discussed by the authors, but assuming that their account is fair it seems that the evolutionary archaeological theorists think that the only
way to be hardheaded and scientific about the Darwinian evolution of culture is to deny all intention, all rationality, on the part of human culture makers. They
opt for ‘‘selection rather than decision making.’’ That is
simply a mistake, for the same reason it would be a mistake to say that the fancy plumage of prize pigeons is
the result of decision making rather than selection. But
Boone and Smith seem to fall into the same trap. For
instance, they are surely right that the adoption of
snowmobiles by the Cree cannot be accounted for in
terms of the differential biological replication of the
snowmobile users, but they misread the more interesting meme’s-eye view (Dawkins, 1976, Dennett 1995).
They say: ‘‘The alternative that ‘snowmobile memes’
were transmitted more effectively than ‘snowshoe
memes’ to nondescendant Cree (as well as offspring),
while plausible, is not natural selection [emphasis
added]; more significant, it requires precisely the kind
of adaptive decision making that evolutionary archaeology is dedicated to eliminating from archaeological explanation.’’ On the contrary, from a meme’s-eye perspective in which the snowmobile meme is seen as the
replicator with its own fitness, just like the fitness of
the domesticated horses that spread so quickly among
the Native Americans after their introduction, then cultural evolution can be seen to be due to ‘‘adaptive decision making’’ while also being a variety of natural selection.
Some memes are like domesticated animals; they are
prized for their benefits, and their replication is closely
fostered and relatively well understood by their human
owners. Some memes are more like rats; they thrive in
the human environment in spite of being positively selected against—ineffectually—by their unwilling hosts.
And some are more like bacteria or viruses, commandeering aspects of human behavior (provoking sneezing,
for instance) in their ‘‘efforts’’ to propagate from host to
host. There is artificial selection of ‘‘good’’ memes—
such as the memes of arithmetic and writing, which are
carefully taught to each new generation. And there is
unconscious selection of memes of all sorts—such as
the subtle mutations in pronunciation that spread
through linguistic groups, presumably with some efficiency advantage but perhaps just hitchhiking on some
quirk of human preference. And there is unconscious
selection of memes that are positively a menace but
prey on flaws in the human decision-making apparatus,
as provided for in the genome and enhanced and adjusted by other cultural innovations—such as the abducted-by-aliens meme, which makes perfect sense
when its own fitness as a cultural replicator is considered.
The antagonism between the evolutionary archaeological and evolutionary ecological camps is perhaps
then due to an overshooting by both sides: the former
sees the prospect of an evolutionary account of artifacts
and ideas that treats human beings as ‘‘mere’’ vectors,
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and the latter sees the prospect of providing evolutionary accounts of the adaptive strategies made possible by
the plasticity of the human phenotypes, and neither
side sees how the two perspectives can be put together—but they can be. The genetic evolution of basic
behavioral capacities and dispositions and preferences
creates highly versatile human phenotypes whose
norms of reaction are immense and largely fitnessenhancing. But these developments bring into existence
a medium of cultural transmission that engenders a
new genre of replicators, and while some of these are
favored by and in turn enhance the adaptive strategies
already laid down, others exploit them ‘‘for their own
benefit.’’ Evolutionary archaeology should pursue all
these phenomena together. Both sides win; both sides
have a contribution to make.
timothy earle
Department of Anthropology, Northwestern
University, 1810 Hinman Ave., Evanston, Ill. 60208,
U.S.A. 29 vii 97
Boone and Smith provide a focused and convincing critique of Dunnell’s school of evolutionary archaeology
and as an alternative offer evolutionary ecology, a set of
behavioral explanations derived from optimal foraging
theory. I am sympathetic to their theoretical positions.
While evolutionary archaeology is to be applauded for
its attention to the archaeological record per se, the
school is naive to assume that one can understand archaeology without understanding the human behavior,
society, and culture that produced it. Boone and Smith
instead focus on human behavior and the evolutionary
roots of human cognitive abilities. They sit on the interfaces between evolutionary biology, cognitive science,
and economics. These interfaces offer extraordinary opportunities for an integrated theory of human behavior,
but as with all reductive theories, the limitations are
profound. What is missing is an understanding of the
emergent properties of larger systems and social institutions.
In their review of evolutionary theories in archaeology and anthropology, Boone and Smith, somewhat surprisingly, ignore processual archaeology. Processual archaeology has a long history that derives from Steward’s
(1955; Harris 1977, Johnson and Earle 1987) theory of
multilinear cultural evolution (for example, Binford
1972, Blanton et al. 1996, Earle and Preucel 1987, Flannery 1972, Wright 1984). These theorists focus on the
organization of human society and on models that explain the development of social institutions. Evolutionary or behavioral ecology, in contrast, focuses attention
on individual activities that are not extensively institutionalized. Much of this work has dealt with foraging
behavior and movement (see, for example, Kelly 1995),
but a profound difference observed in human life experiences cross-culturally is in the scale of institutional
elaboration: family-level, local groups, chiefdoms,
states, and world systems (Johnson and Earle 1987). To

be sure, the individual agent, sculpted by both culture
and evolutionary selection, is important in all institutional contexts, but the properties of the institutions—
for example, the male supremacy complex in local
groups (Harris 1977) and the competitive political economy in chiefdoms (Earle 1997)—dominate (or channel)
individual behavior. The revolution of macroeconomics, as a further example, recognized that the operation
of economic systems cannot be reduced to individual
rationality; labor, capital, and monetary flows have
properties that must be modeled and understood.
Neither evolutionary archaeology nor evolutionary
ecology considers how institutions are built up, operate,
and determine human behavior, on the one hand, and
the artifactual record, on the other. Although group selection has been shown to be theoretically inadequate
and functionalist assumptions are in disfavor, institutional dynamics are evidently critical to the operation
of human society and must be understood to explain
long-term evolutionary processes. Anthropology’s concern with institutions is of long standing, because the
physical reality of clans, lineages, chiefdoms, churches,
businesses, bureaucracies, and the like, determines
much of what happens in human lives.
Selection is central to the evolutionary theories considered in this article. But what determines the genetic
fitness of a human? Certainly much has to do with personal decisions about subsistence, mating, display,
competition, and the rest. Behavioral ecology offers intriguing explanations of these. In complex society, however, a person’s reproductive success and cultural impact are more likely an outcome of institutional
affiliation and context. Whether one is a king or a pauper, a member of a large clan or of a small one, an urban
craftsman or a rural farmer, Muslim or Hindu fundamentally determines the nature of one’s life and activities in particular societies. Choices are heavily constrained in ways that are very basic to complex human
societies. These are problems of how individuals associate and how they identify and control each other’s activities. The evolution of human society involves the
formation of institutions and the maintenance of power
relationships within and between them (see, for example, DeMarrais, Castillo, and Earle 1996, Earle 1997).
t e r r y l. h u n t, m a r k e. m a d s e n,
a nd c a r l p. l ip o
Department of Anthropology, University of Hawai’i,
2424 Maile Way, Honolulu, Hawaii 96822, U.S.A.
(thunt@hawaii.edu) (Hunt)/Emergent Media Inc.,
1809 Seventh Ave. East, Suite 908, Seattle, Wash.
98101, U.S.A. (madsen@emergentmedia.com)
(Madsen)/Department of Anthropology, Box 353100,
University of Washington, Seattle, Wash. 98195-3100,
U.S.A. (clipo@u.washington.edu) (Lipo). 4 ix 97
This paper raises several significant issues with regard
to the ongoing challenge of building an evolutionary archaeology. In the effort to create a polemic, however,
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it does little more than caricature a continuing, indeed,
nascent, discussion—conflating or simplifying many
critical points and driving a wedge between complementary aspects of ecology and evolution in Darwinian
theory. As a consequence, some will seize upon this paper as a warrant for abandoning the effort to bring historical science to anthropology. We think that this
would be unfortunate.
Boone and Smith argue that the problem with evolutionary archaeology lies in its ‘‘flawed grasp of evolutionary biology, not in its advocacy of Darwinism per
se.’’ They offer instead what they believe is ‘‘a conceptually more complex but realistic view of phenotypic
variation.’’ Central to their argument is the familiar, decidedly non-Darwinian claim that ‘‘organisms (including humans) have been designed by selection to make
extensive adaptive adjustments to their phenotypes. . . .
Under this view, natural selection’s primary role lies in
accounting for these cognitive mechanisms.’’
This claim is empirical, not theoretical. The argument is that many organisms including humans have
developed behavioral systems so efficient that they act
optimally and adaptively with no effective role for natural selection in their operation and persistence. Such a
position is at home in anthropology, where teleological
causation has dominated the non-Darwinian paradigm
of cultural evolution (e.g., Harris 1979; see Dunnell
1980, Richerson 1977, Smith 1983). Despite its significance, Boone and Smith do not attempt to substantiate
their empirical claim of human adaptiveness independent of selection but merely assume its truth as axiomatic.
But such a claim is not widely shared by evolutionary
ecologists. Stephens and Krebs (1986), for example,
point out that foraging theories are formal models of optimal behaviors given specific assumptions, specific environments, and biological constraints. Among the reasons for testing formal models they list ‘‘to ask how
good organisms are at doing their jobs,’’ ‘‘to ask what
animals are designed to do,’’ and ‘‘to analyze behavioral
mechanisms’’ (p. 183). Theoretical models in evolutionary ecology are measurement tools; they are heuristic—
a point made often and by many (e.g., Bettinger 1986;
Krebs and Davies 1987; Maynard Smith 1978; Smith
1987:205). In short, the use of notions of optimality, decision making, adaptiveness, etc., derived from field biology or microeconomics does not eliminate the causal
role of natural selection or other evolutionary processes
in explaining genetic or cultural change.
Boone and Smith have confused empirical observations (and heuristic assumptions) about the behavior of
humans with the theory used to explain that behavior.
They assume things that we might seek to understand
in scientific terms and thus confuse description with
explanation. Such confusion is, unfortunately, common
to the mainstream empiricism of the social sciences
(Willer and Willer 1973). At another scale, they conflate
the explanatory structure of ecology and evolution,
imagining that differential persistence in the long term
can simply be conceived in spacelike (functional) terms

in contrast to the timelike (historical) frames of evolution (Dunnell 1982; see also Elster 1983). As a consequence, they overlook the critical explanatory significance of variation. Their central claim therefore
represents neither the position of evolutionary ecologists nor the ‘‘Darwinian’’ approach in general.
Boone and Smith rightly point out that archaeologists
need to begin taking formal models of cultural transmission seriously (e.g., Boyd and Richerson 1985) as
part of a general mathematization of our reasoning, data
description, and testing. Formal models will be necessary to test hypotheses of culturally transmitted replicators and the phenotypes they create, a difficult
task whether one is referring to genetic or cultural information-to-phenotype linkages. Nevertheless, most
advocates of an evolutionary archaeology understand
the need for a clearly articulated theory of cultural
transmission if evolution in phenotypes is to be studied
rigorously. The mechanics and quantitative properties
of transmission cannot be studied in the fossil record;
instead we must combine formal modeling and experimental study with living animals to work out the details. What falls to archaeology today is the task of deriving expectations from theories of transmission and
selection that can be rewritten in a form measurable in
a fossil record of behavior and morphology. Whether the
models involved are of selection or neutrality, evolutionary archaeologists have begun the difficult task of
bringing individual-based models into concordance
with the time-averaged pooled archaeological record of
patterned behavior and multiple phenotypes (e.g., Lipo
et al. n.d.). However, unlike Boone and Smith, we believe that the strictures of science require the subject
matter to be the record itself, not the untestable behavioral reconstructions imagined from ethnographic analogies. In this regard, we oppose the uncritical use of behavioral reconstruction (e.g., following Schiffer [e.g.,
1976, 1996] and his students) as an empirically sufficient strategy for archaeological research.
In our view, and we suspect the view of the majority
of evolutionary ecologists and evolutionary archaeologists, it is the anthropological baggage of cultural evolution and the reification of theory from tool to empirical
reality that reveal Boone and Smith’s central claim to
be misguided.
g e o r ge t. j o ne s
Department of Anthropology, Hamilton College,
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Boone and Smith make a persuasive argument that phenotypic adaptation, not natural selection or drift, has
been the primary force guiding human cultural evolution, perhaps since the rise of anatomically modern humans. Their case builds from several observations about
humans, among which are unprecedented behavioral
plasticity, the capacity for facultative response to opportunity and constraint, and the rapidity with which
these evaluations may be transmitted by cultural
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means. They deny that natural selection is directly involved in most instances of adaptively significant cultural change because the pace of cultural change is too
rapid to be monitored by biological reproduction. In
their view, the technologies and organizational strategies of humans evolve, to be sure, but this is not because external conditions favor some variants over others through differential fitness but because of a more
direct process, adaptation.
This view asks selectionists to reconsider the mechanism behind change, abandoning a view that technology and behavior are directly under the influence of selective pressures for a view more akin to artificial
selection. The external environment to which humans
adapt culturally represents opportunities and constraints in the literal, not the metaphorical sense, since
humans can identify them and ruminate on the best
course of action to enhance success. In the chain of
causal statements explaining change, then, the environment is more distant and decision making more proximate to the events under scrutiny. If natural selection
plays any role, it is in engineering decision rules or cognitive algorithms, which Boone and Smith claim guide
adaptive responses. These decision rules, which are
readily transmitted culturally, are products of selection
and perhaps evolved deep in human history. We do not
learn from this discussion, however, whether these
rules show phenotypic variability or are mutable—in
short, whether natural selection might still be acting on
them. In fact, we do not learn of the empirical status of
these rules at all, that is, whether they are traits that
natural selection really can work on. For a science professing a materialist outlook, this reliance on what in
other theoretical guises amounts to norms or elementary structures seems inappropriate; one wonders if
competition between individuals or among corporate
groups or serious failures to implement rules correctly
have evolutionary consequences.
According to Boone and Smith, phenotypic adaptability is the most parsimonious explanation of rapid adoption or abandonment of behavioral or technological
variants. How else, after all, can we explain the rate and
scale of adoption of much modern material culture of
apparently little selective value (unless one subscribes
to the fitness value of waste)? In this view, we no longer
maintain the key distinction between mechanisms of
transmission and of proximate cause, on the one hand,
and those relating to the persistence of variants across
many generations, on the other. Drift and selection disappear; the steady application of decision rules, generation by generation, will yield the same directional or
static patterns of behavioral variant representation. But
how can it be shown that this is a result of adaptation
rather than selection when even the effects of single biological traits on reproductive fitness are so difficult to
measure?
Given the difficulty of showing that phenotypic
adaptability rather than natural selection is the operative mechanism in most cultural change, do the examples support Boone and Smith’s claims? Certainly the

adoption of the snowmobile by Cree hunters was
rapid—within a generation. This does seem to support
a mechanism other than natural selection for the success of this technology. But can we claim from the example that there have been or will be no consequences
for biological fitness or, to move into a less certain
realm, for cultural reproduction, let us say in the fitness
of decision-rule variants? To evaluate these questions,
along with a longer time series we would need a less
inclusive scale, for instance, comparing corporate
groups with differential access to snowmobile technology or groups whose foraging territories differ in resource quality.
In the end, I am intrigued by Boone and Smith’s notions of decision rules and have further appreciation for
the cascading effects of cultural transmission at that
scale of analysis. They have striking consequences for
what might be phrased as cultural founder effects.
These mechanisms are not, however, as clearly responsible as natural selection and drift for longer-term patterns that archaeologists regularly consider.
marc kodack
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 1222 Spruce St., PD-C,
St. Louis, Mo. 63103, U.S.A. (kodack@smtp.mvs.
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Boone and Smith have provided a valuable comparison
and needed critique of the two dominant uses of Darwinian theory in archaeology. They label these approaches evolutionary archaeology and evolutionary
ecology. As an example of how they differ, Boone and
Smith examine how Winterhalder’s (1981) work on the
adoption of snowmobiles by the Cree in the mid-1970s
is explained by each. They suggest that Ramenofsky’s
interpretation that natural selection is directly at work
in the adoption of snowmobiles fails to consider the
decision-making plasticity of Cree foragers. This plasticity is continually stressed throughout their discussion.
I suggest, however, that the entire Cree example is
flawed, regardless of which interpretation one accepts.
Neither accounts for all the costs that would enter into
the decision making of a typical Cree forager ca. 1975.
Although Winterhalder (1981:71) discounted the cost of
the purchase of the snowmobile and the fuel to operate
it, the costs are not insignificant; hard currency is limited but necessary to obtain the snowmobile and fuel in
the community of Muskrat Dam Lake, where Winterhalder conducted his research.
If we view a snowmobile as a material good that
passes through many phases during its useful life, we
can divide a snowmobile’s life-cycle cost into at least
three phases: (1) initial purchase cost, (2) maintenance,
and (3) eventual replacement. Although adopting snowmobiles increased foraging efficiency among the Cree,
thus permitting higher return rates, Winterhalder and,
subsequently, Boone and Smith have assumed that all
Cree hunters could embrace this method for higher for-
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aging efficiency. However, for some Cree hunters living
in Muskrat Dam Lake in 1975, the limited hard currency available to them coupled with an assessment of
the overall life-cycle costs of a snowmobile may have
led them to forgo a snowmobile and continue to use
snowshoes in hunting instead. Thus, the decision to use
‘‘new’’ technology may have been economic and not
based on a way to increase foraging efficiency. The
worst-case scenario would be if a ‘‘successful’’ traditional Cree hunter could not afford a snowmobile; he
would be forced to forgo a method of hunting that
would further increase his foraging efficiency.
In not considering or discussing how hard currency
affects decision making, Boone and Smith miss the opportunity to demonstrate how an evolutionary ecological approach can incorporate the impact of Western economic systems on our understanding of traditional
subsistence economies through such models as optimal
foraging and diet breadth. In fact, Smith has considered
sub-Arctic forager participation in a mixed economy in
his study among the Inujjuamiut (Smith 1991:357–97).
Using this study instead of the Cree case would have
strengthened Boone and Smith’s argument that evolutionary ecology can be used in both archaeological and
ethnographic settings. The Inujjuamiut case study
would also have highlighted the weakness of evolutionary archaeological explanations in general and Ramenofsky’s in particular by showing that they are too
quick to embrace the direct action of natural selection
as an explanation of human behavior. Additionally,
Ramenofsky’s explanation ignores the significant influences and methodological difficulties that forager
participation in a mixed economy has for explanations
incorporating natural selection. Smith (1991:368–70) at
least attempts to identify and then confront these difficulties.
I presume that if we were to introduce mobile globalpositioning-system equipment and mobile satellite
telephones into Cree society of 1997, even if all available hunters had equal access to snowmobiles, we could
again cite economic reasons and not evolutionary archaeological or evolutionary ecological explanations for
further increasing the efficiency of these foragers. We
should consider how ‘‘new’’ technology confers value
on very accurate locational information about the distribution and density of mobile and sessile resources.
We could then ask under what circumstances this locational information would be defended (see DysonHudson and Smith 1978).
Elsewhere, Boone and Smith discuss how evolutionary ecology can incorporate intention into its explanations. I find it ironic that Richard Dawkins, often cited
by evolutionary archaeologists, discusses intention
when he compares (1996:16) the differences between
evolutionary processes and designoids. In the case of the
potter wasp and the mason bee, ‘‘the wasp and the bee
didn’t consciously or deliberately design their pots. . . .
[They have] no concept of a pot as a work of art, or as
a container’’ (Dawkins 1996:16). The wasp and the bee
are ‘‘working’’ to provide protection for the next genera-

tion through the construction of containers that look to
us like pots.

r ob e r t l. k e l l y
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I strongly agree with Boone and Smith’s critique of evolutionary archaeology. Although human populations
are at some level affected by the same selective processes as affect all organic life, humans are different because they have a ‘‘response’’ time that is less than a
generation, acquired traits are ‘‘passed down’’ from parents, peers, and/or others, and innovation is not simply
a function of random mutation and thus ‘‘undirected.’’
But selection (beyond selection that occurred in the distant past to create the plastic behavioral capacity of humans) may have occurred and still be occurring. My
problem with evolutionary archaeology is that it tends
to mask, obscure or gloss over past human behavior to
the point where the paradigm is no longer useful as a
learning strategy. I agree that evolutionary ecology provides a better learning strategy (and has far more empirical cases to its credit); I don’t see evolutionary archaeology providing a method for determining the
truthfulness of its assertions. The high ratio of theoretical to empirical treatises is telling.
It is still unclear to me whether evolutionary archaeology attributes directional change to the replicative
success of the trait or to the direct increased reproductive fitness of its bearers. Both seem to be potentially at
work. If a man comes up with a new projectile point or
hunting tactic that cuts the cost of harvesting game and
increases his return rate, it is reasonable to assume that
his neighbor will copy that behavior unless something
limits access to the technology or start-up costs (e.g.,
knowledge, manufacturing skills) are too high or the
proposed change would reduce the user’s ability to meet
another cultural goal that the neighbor perceives as
more important (and presumably has or had adaptive
benefits). Perhaps, then, selection in the strict sense (of
the bearers of a trait) gains strength as a force over phenotypic adaptation in cultural change along some gradient of increasing cost of adopting a new tactic or technology.
For example, some argue that about 1,000 years ago
speakers of Numic languages migrated into the Great
Basin of western North America and replaced (or subsumed) the existing ‘‘non-Numa’’ population. Bettinger
(e.g., Bettinger and Baumhoff 1982) argues that the nonNuma were nomadic and took high-return-rate resources such as large game; the Numa were less nomadic and had a broader diet, including small seeds and
pinyon nuts, utilizing some different technologies (e.g.,
seed beaters) and tactics (e.g., green-cone-pinyon procurement). Bettinger argues that the Numa outcompeted the non-Numa, who migrated, became extinct, or
intermarried and lost their language. A common re-
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sponse to this scenario is: Why didn’t the non-Numa
adopt the Numa’s behavior?
One reason could be that the Numa’s foraging tactics
carried a cost that was perceived as too high by nonNuma. Among many foragers, sharing meat from large
game is a primary way men acquire prestige and possibly more mating opportunities and/or resources for
their offspring; among others, men devote time directly
to giving resources and attention to their offspring
(Kelly 1995). If the Numa came from an environment in
which the latter tactic conferred greater fitness than the
former, then they would have imported this trait into
the Basin. Non-Numa men might have been reluctant
to give up hunting even if in the long term that choice
made them less competitive, as they might have seen
only the perceived loss in status and benefits that would
result from forgoing an opportunity to hunt in order to
collect small game or to care for children.
Likewise, women’s foraging is affected by whether
children tag along and whether they collect some of
their own food (see Hawkes 1996). Without children,
women can collect at higher return rates. The amount
of foraging that children do is linked to how easy it is
to get food and how dangerous foraging is for children
(this would have been the same for the Numa and nonNuma) and also by the perceived availability of caretakers. In some foraging societies, children have multiple
caregivers; in others the mother is the primary caregiver. What if Numa women entered from an environment in which a notion of child care prevailed (presumably because it bestowed greater adaptive advantage)
that resulted in their leaving children at camp and this
allowed them to forage more efficiently than nonNuma women and, presumably, raise more offspring to
adulthood?
These factors may have resulted in a higher growth
rate for the Numa, resulting in their ‘‘takeover’’ of the
Great Basin. This scenario may or may not be correct,
but the more general points are that human cultural behavior may be under selection à la evolutionary archaeology in only a limited range of cases; seeing technology
as part of the phenotype and not also as a reflection of
behavior (the tactics) that is part of the phenotype could
be misleading (i.e., behavioral reconstruction is somewhat necessary); the frequencies of behaviors in a population, as evolutionary ecology argues, are largely the
outcome of individuals’ making decisions among often
conflicting goals within natural and social environments that set different payoffs to different behaviors.
r ob e r t d. l e on a r d
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Let us consider a hypothetical society of farmers trying
to make a living in an arid environment. Rainfall is unpredictable and may be highly localized. The uplands
tend to receive more moisture, but the growing season

is shorter here than in the lowlands. Pests are a constant
threat, yet major impacts tend to be localized. Technology includes a variety of chipped stone tools, digging
sticks, and hoes. Farmers may plant early and/or late in
the spring to avoid killing spring and fall frosts and may
plant in single fields or many. While most farmers take
advantage of simple technology that increases water
runoff onto fields, others dry-farm. Males are the farmers, and land is held by women. Cultural transmission
occurs obliquely when a boy’s mother’s brother teaches
him how to farm. Transmission occurs horizontally
when farmers share knowledge. How to be a good
farmer is encoded in religious teachings, and ritual objects serve as mnemonic devices that also provide instruction in acceptable farming practices. Farmers who
generate successful harvests are much admired, and
their consultation and advice are appreciated. Hero
myths are constructed around a few. If necessary, weave
into this picture the vicissitudes of meaningful human
life, however you see them.
If I am understanding Boone and Smith correctly, in
evolutionary ecological terms the behavior of this hypothetical society has been designed by natural selection
to make extensive adaptive adjustments or exhibit phenotypic plasticity. The extent of these behaviors over a
range of environmental conditions is called the reaction
norm. Decision rules—here learned behavior—guide
what people do, not natural selection. Explanations are
often constructed in terms of efficiency and costs and
benefits, among other factors that might influence decision rules. Here human intent plays a role, as individuals may indeed direct the course of their own existence,
at least in part. Boone and Smith assert that this perspective yields valuable understandings of human behavior. I agree. I particularly value it for explaining the
evolved behavior of contemporary and historic peoples
within a synchronic framework.
Now let us push this society through time for a few
thousand years or so, letting them build an archaeological record that represents aspects of the reaction norm
and decision rules for times t1, t2, t3. Given the environment specified above and human ingenuity at generating variation (or attempts at problem solving, if you prefer), few readers would be surprised if the archaeological
record of our group exhibited changing reaction norms
as well as decision rules. The varied strategies and tactics of production should exhibit differential success in
response to changing environmental conditions. Some
behaviors and technologies may be dropped from the
repertoire completely as new ones are generated. From
time t1 through t3 our hypothetical society has constantly been in the process of becoming something else,
with associated new reaction norms and decision rules.
Importantly, and as evolutionary biologists have taught
us, it is never possible for our hypothetical society to
reattain a previous state, given the vagaries of history
that influence evolution.
To the evolutionary archaeologist this is human evolution. Evolutionary archaeologists seek to account for
change in human behavior primarily in terms of the
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evolutionary processes of natural selection, sorting, and
drift. Intent and individual or group efforts to direct the
course of evolution are irrelevant at this scale, as the
generation of variation, however knowledgeable and directed, is independent of natural selection. All of our
problem-solving farmers intended success as they employed their technologies and thus indirectly influenced
the course of evolution.
However, not all succeeded, and through time, the
operation of the evolutionary processes of natural selection, sorting, and drift likely would have continually
and irrevocably changed the society. To the evolutionary archaeologist, explanation of these changes is
achieved in part by isolating the relative importance of
these mechanisms through time in evolutionary context. Evolutionary archaeologists assert that this perspective yields valuable understandings of the evolution of human behavior. I agree.
To understand why evolutionary archaeologists adopt
the metaphysical position they do, interested readers
might examine the literature discussing the differences
between timelike and spacelike frameworks, as illustrated above. They may also want to examine the extensive biological literature that discusses the different, yet
interdependent, metaphysics of evolution and ecology.
s te v e n m i t h e n
Department of Archaeology, University of Reading,
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I am in complete agreement with the views expressed
by Boone and Smith: evolutionary archaeology is a
doomed enterprise based on flawed theoretical premises
that can make no significant contribution to our explanation of the variability in the archaeological record and
our understanding of past behaviour. The reasons for
this are sufficiently well described in their article that
I have no reason to repeat or expand upon them (as I
have done elsewhere [Mithen 1997]). How cultural
selectionism/evolutionary archaeology can have been
taken so seriously for so many years and how so many
new publications adopting this approach continue to
appear in the literature is quite beyond me. Similarly, I
am repeatedly surprised that prestigious academics
whose other work I highly respect seem to take seriously the notion of ‘‘memes’’ as a cultural equivalent
of genes (e.g., Dennett 1996): the notion of ‘‘memes’’ is
simply fallacious, the vital differences between
‘‘memes’’ and genes having been exposed by Lake
(1996). Therefore, while I applaud this article by Boone
and Smith, I am also saddened and irritated that such
an article is necessary at all.
My strong feelings on this issue no doubt arise from
the fact that I have written at length in support of the
evolutionary ecological approach in archaeology. In my
1990 book I put forward the argument that natural selection is relevant in our discipline only with regard to
how it has shaped the human mind/brain—our means

of making decisions. We can safely assume that it has
provided us with a means for adaptive decision making,
and as archaeologists we can exploit this assumption for
developing models of past behaviour. But such models
need to be based at the level of individual behaviour,
and to operationalise them we need to take into account
the formation processes of the archaeological record
(Mithen 1993). One solution as to how we can move
from the short-term decisions of past individuals to the
long-term, aggregate patterns of the archaeological record is by using computer simulation as a methodological tool.
I must, however, raise three issues regarding this
‘‘adaptive decision-making’’ apparatus that we carry
within our minds/brains. Perhaps the most important
is whether we have a single, general-purpose decisionmaking/learning device or multiple devices each having been selected to solve a different adaptive problem
in our evolutionary past. The weight of the evidence
from psychology (e.g., Hirschfeld and Gelman 1994) and
human evolution (Mithen 1996) suggests strongly that
it is the latter. This has very considerable consequences
for how an evolutionary ecological approach to human
behaviour can be developed, especially when dealing
with behaviour for which specialised adaptive decisionmaking devices are likely to be absent.
Because the pace of culture change has been so rapid
during the past 50,000 years—during which we assume
that the decision-making devices of the mind/brain
have not evolved—we may be inherently unsuited to
making adaptive decisions in relation to a whole range
of problems found in the modern world (e.g., should we
create genetically engineered foods? should we use new
medical technologies to keep extremely premature babies alive?). Moreover, when faced with these problems
for which we do not have an evolved decision-making
device, we may apply one suited to a different type of
problem, with highly maladaptive results. In this regard, adopting an evolutionary ecological approach in
which emphasis is placed on evolved cognitive mechanisms does not constitute an adaptationist programme.
A second but related issue is the narrow range of behaviours to which an evolutionary ecological approach
is currently applied. It is fine for tackling the ‘‘food and
sex stuff’’ about human behaviour—these are precisely
the problems for which adaptive decision-making cognitive devices are likely to have evolved. Thus archaeologists adopting an evolutionary ecological approach
have had some success at understanding the food
choices made by past people and technological choices
when these directly impinge on food acquisition and, in
anthropological contexts, when tackling issues such as
mate choice. But at present this Darwinian approach appears to have little to say about aspects of human behaviour which do not have such direct bearing on reproductive success, such as which art style to choose or
which religious entities to believe in. Unless archaeologists who adopt an evolutionary ecological approach begin tackling these issues rather than just focusing on
subsistence, their approach will never become widely
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employed within the discipline: free rein will be given
to theoretically flawed approaches (e.g., evolutionary archaeology) which seek legitimation by aligning themselves with a Darwinian paradigm, and evolutionary
ecology will remain the preserve of hunter-gatherer specialists alone.
There is certainly potential for developing a Darwinian archaeology which can address issues with a less direct bearing on reproductive success than foraging and
mate choice (i.e., food and sex). But to do so we must
delve deeper into the evolutionary history of the mind/
brain and go beyond making vague generalisations
about evolved cognitive mechanisms for decision making, as I myself have attempted to do (Mithen 1996). As
archaeologists we need to build stronger links with evolutionary psychologists (who also need to work more
closely with archaeologists to achieve their own aims)
so that we can develop more sophisticated models of
evolved decision-making devices and, more generally,
of how our minds work. An example of the work to
which we can perhaps aspire is Pascal Boyer’s (1994)
study of the transmission of religious ideas. In this he
shows how an understanding of evolved mental mechanisms can constrain the likelihood with which different
religious ideas can survive the rigours of cultural transmission.
A third issue I wish to raise is that of multiple goals.
When an optimal-foraging/decision-making model is
developed, one normally assumes a single goal, such as
minimising risk or maximising the rate of energy intake
(or the ‘‘meliorising’’ equivalents [Mithen 1989b]). The
application of the model evaluates the likelihood of
achieving this goal, together with whether one has correctly identified the constraints under which decision
making takes place. The problem of multiple goals is
present when dealing with any animal species, but it becomes particularly acute when dealing with humans.
Subsistence behaviour, for instance, is so thoroughly
embedded in social and ideological behaviour that decisions about which foodstuffs to exploit are made in
light of many competing goals—to satisfy one’s nutritional needs, to secure food to share, to gain highprestige food, to conform to ideological beliefs about
appropriate foods to eat, etc. This interaction of a
multiplicity of goals has been made most clear in relation to projectile points, the design of which among
modern humans is clearly made in light of a wide range
of social, economic, and ideological factors (e.g., Wiessner 1993). I believe that this problem of the complex interbedding of any activity in multiple domains of behaviour is a particular feature of modern humans
(Mithen 1996) and consequently creates problems in the
development of optimal-foraging/decision-making
models not faced by ecologists dealing with other animal species. Indeed, the foraging models currently applied to modern hunter-gatherers as described by Boone
and Smith, which are largely unmodified from those
used for other animals, are probably more appropriate
for premodern human behaviour prior to the emergence

of this interbedding of behaviour or what I have termed
‘‘cognitive fluidity.’’ Of course, a problem we face is
that their development and application become more
difficult as we go farther back into human evolution because of the increasingly coarse grain of the archaeological record.
In summary, I agree wholeheartedly with Boone and
Smith’s critique of evolutionary archaeology and support their espousal of evolutionary ecology in archaeology. But at present, this remains as narrow in the types
of human behaviour that it tackles as it did two decades
ago, when exactly the same generalisations about
evolved decision-making cognitive devices were being
made. I want to see much greater attention paid to the
nature of evolved mechanisms in the mind and a more
explicit recognition that a Darwinian archaeology does
not constitute an adaptationist programme. I believe we
need greater willingness to tackle nonsubsistencerelated issues in archaeology from this perspective and
to acknowledge that models developed for other foraging species may not be as easily applicable to modern
humans as has been previously argued. These comments are not meant to detract from the value of Boone
and Smith’s paper, and I certainly want to see a much
greater application in archaeology of foraging models in
which explicit reference is made to individual decision
making of precisely the type they describe. I simply
think that the evolutionary ecological approach they
support is capable of making a far greater impact on our
understanding of human behaviour in the past and present than is currently the case.
a nn f. r a me n o f s ky
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‘‘Is It Evolution Yet?’’ is a timely and important contribution to the developing theory of evolution in anthropology. For too long evolutionary archaeology and evolutionary ecology have worked in isolation. I am
hopeful that this article signals a change in which mutual benefits outweigh costs. Although there is much
in it that is worthy of in-depth discussion, I restrict my
comments to Boone and Smith’s criticisms of my work
on native artifact replacement.
The basis for Boone and Smith’s criticism is one sentence in which I link the spread of snowmobiles among
the Cree to the success of the horse in North America.
The spread of the horse occurred over approximately
100 years, that of snowmobiles in less than a generation. As Boone and Smith state, the Cree example is too
brief in evolutionary time to consider Darwinian selection as the mechanism of change, but selection was not
the point. I linked the two introduced technologies to
show that adoption is ongoing; at some later time snowmobiles may become grist for the evolutionary mill.
Their criticism is, however, out of context, because
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my paper in press is not about Cree or snowmobiles; a
continuation of ideas published in 1995, it is a preliminary effort to build an evolutionary archaeological description of why European artifacts replace native artifacts, with a ‘‘replacement’’ defined as ‘‘adoption and
persistence.’’ Dunnell’s concept of function (as fitness
costs) frames the discussion, and I consider how European and Native American raw materials could affect
individual fitness differentially, resulting in replacement.
My approach contrasts with the culture-contact literature on artifact change and with Winterhalder’s research with the Cree (1977, 1980, 1981). Acculturationists describe and explain artifact change. Although
their descriptions are rich in detail, their explanations
are problematic. They lodge explanation in the adoption
process or the superiority of European products and
technologies, both incomplete in evolutionary terms.
Because evolution is a two-stage process, adoption cannot explain persistence. If we assume that artifacts contribute to fitness, survival of populations is partially a
consequence of artifacts. The survival of human populations on both sides of the Atlantic suggests that, though
different, artifacts were perfectly adequate, fitnessenhancing solutions. Why, then, should European technologies and artifacts replace native materials and products? I still think that this is an important and largely
unanswered question.
Although an evolutionist, Winterhalder is not directly concerned with snowmobiles in his Cree work.
His interest is Cree prey choices and changing diet
breadth. Snowmobiles are a new artifact adopted because they reduce search and pursuit times—that is,
they increase efficiency. In contrast to statements by
Boone and Smith, Winterhalder does not test hypotheses on changing diet breadth. Nor does he analyze the
costs (fuel, labor etc.) of adoption (see Smith 1991 for
analyses of some costs among the Inujjuamiut). Simply,
Winterhalder assumes benefits of the new technology
without evaluating costs. Although more satisfying
then portrayals of artifact change by acculturationists,
Winterhalder’s account still misses the mark because
he embeds snowmobile adoption in foraging theory.
Boone and Smith consider this an acceptable explanation for snowmobile adoption, but I am less convinced,
especially in light of the sweep of artifact replacements
in Cree hunting equipment—rifles, canvas canoes followed by outboards, and wire traps (Rogers 1954; Winterhalder 1977, 1981).
The snowmobile case highlights significant differences between the two evolutionary approaches. They
are girded by different concepts and assumptions, and
because we do not know which, if any, of these are correct, I believe that serious intellectual discussion must
begin with them. Boone and Smith, for instance, adopt
a narrow view of Dawkins’s evolutionary units, the replicator and the vehicle (Dawkins 1978, 1982, 1989). Artifacts cannot be the focus of investigation because artifacts are not replicators. Genes are replicators and, over

evolutionary time, have built cognitive structures in
which individuals make optimal decisions. Focusing on
behavior facilitates examining whether or not decisions
maximize fitness.
My conception of evolution is strongly influenced by
Hull’s units, the replicator and the interactor (Hull
1980, 1981, 1988, 1994). His definitions free replicators
and interactors of a particular taxonomic level. In addition, depending on circumstances, the same entity can
function as both replicator and interactor. Using these
units to measure and track change has significant ramifications for evolutionary description and explanation.
First, artifacts can be the focus of investigation, making
our task the determination of whether and in what
ways alternative traits differ in fitness. Slight differences in costs can have consequences over evolutionary
time. Secondly, evolutionary pathways are quirky and
unpredictable. This very quirkiness raises fundamental
questions about evolved cognition and optimality. Because we are historical documents, it is possible that
historical cognitive structures and circumstances sometimes conflict, resulting in decisions that are less than
optimal and may reduce fitness. In this case, we need
to rethink whether universal optimality is a fruitful
tool for measuring evolutionary change.
p e t e r j. r i c he r so n, r ob e rt b o y d,
a nd r ob e r t l. b e tt i n g e r
Division of Environmental Studies, University of
California, Davis, Calif. 95616/Department of
Anthropology, University of California, Los Angeles,
Calif. 90024/Department of Anthropology, University
of California, Davis, Calif. 95616, U.S.A. 2 ix 97
This article raises a number of important issues, some
of which we discuss elsewhere (Bettinger, Boyd, and
Richerson 1996). There are two points we want to stress
here, one theoretical and the other empirical.
The theoretical point is that cultural transmission
makes decisions that individuals make an evolutionary
force much like natural selection. One outcome of the
coupling of deliberate invention and strategic adoption
of innovations to transmission by social learning is to
make even very weak, marginal decision making an
agent of rapid change at the population level in the long
run. Indeed, the main hypothesis to emerge from the
theorizing of Boyd and Richerson (1985) was that the
great adaptive advantage of the cultural system in a
highly variable environment such as the Pleistocene
stems from the substantial increase in rate of evolution
possible when weak, low-cost but statistically adaptive
decision rules supplement natural selection. Very
crudely, what we call the costly-information hypothesis
holds that decision-making forces and natural selection
acting on cultural variation ought to be equally important. We say ‘‘crudely’’ because it is impossible to predict the mixture quantitatively without knowing much
more than we do about the costs and benefits of setting
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up decision-making and culture-transmitting psychologies. One way of portraying the debate between evolutionary archaeology and evolutionary ecology is to say
that they have different intuitions about the relative
importance of decision making and natural selection in
causing cultural evolution. The costly-information hypothesis suggests that this is an entirely reasonable debate. The extremes—all selection or all decision making—are equally unlikely, yet the debates in all fields
of the social sciences tend to portray rational-actor theory and culture-historical explanations (of which the
evolutionary archaeological account is a particular theoretically motivated version) as competing rather than
ultimately complementary.
The empirical point is obvious: we need to estimate
the strength of decision-making and selective effects in
a broad sample of cases before we can make any generalizations. Unsophisticated wet-finger-to-the-wind empiricism suggests that the costly-information hypothesis is plausible. Consider stock archaeological patterns:
The origins of agriculture, the rise of states, and other
major features of cultural evolution are events with
time scales of millennia, yet over millennia fantastic
changes in and diversifications of cultural adaptations
occur. Cultural evolution is too slow to be explained entirely by individual strategizing but much faster than
unaided organic evolution, consistent with a mixture of
selective and decision-making forces. Archaeologists
could make this argument much more quantitative. Paleontologists have measured the rates of organic evolution in terms of a unit known as the ‘‘darwin,’’ where
1 darwin is a change by the factor e, the base of the natural logarithms, in a character per million years (see discussion in Ridley 1993: chap. 19). A fair number of such
rates have been measured and can be used as a yardstick
to see if rates of cultural evolution do really generally
exceed those of organic evolution. For example, since
the end of the Pleistocene human societies have increased in size from averages of perhaps 1,000 to an average of perhaps 1,000,000 in the past 10,000 years. This
gives a rate of change of ca. 700 darwins, compared with
a range of 0.11–32.0 darwins in a sample of 46 morphological characters from post-Pleistocene mammals
(Gingerich 1983). Human societies are clearly evolving
very rapidly, and the evolutionary force of decision
making is a candidate for explaining why. Some hints
might come out of a large sample of evolutionary rates.
The theory suggests that in domains where judgments
are easy, individual decisions should be strong forces
and evolution correspondingly rapid. The Cree’s adoption of snowmobiles is an example. In general, we
might expect that in many domains of technology diffusion, easy-to-try-out, easy-to-acquire innovations will
spread rapidly. Contrariwise, social organizational innovations are hard to observe (just how do polygynists
manage the complexities of multiwife households? monogamous ones try most of us) and hard to try out (the
range of marriage institutions one can experiment with
in one lifetime is strictly limited).
It also should be possible to measure the relative im-

portance of selection and decision-making forces directly in living societies. As far as we are aware, there
is only one set of data that comes close to doing this.
Roof and McKinney (1987:chap. 5) present data derived
from questionnaires estimating the effects of birthrates
(selection) and switching (decisions) on the net growth
rates of groups of churches in the United States. There
are striking effects of selection. The biggest discrepancy
is between black and conservative white Protestants
and those with no affiliation. People with no affiliation
have only a little more than half as many children as
the two types of conservative Protestants. Conservatives also have about a 30% birthrate advantage over
liberal Protestants. Decision making also has a big effect, especially on loss rates from liberal and moderate
Protestant churches. Historically, liberal churches, perhaps because they were socially more prestigious, attracted considerable net switching from moderate
churches. Among younger people, this flow has slowed
to a balance of switching in and out, while the net loss
to nonaffiliation is about 9% of the number born to liberal churches. Among under-age-45 people, conservative white churches have a slight net gain (5%) over
other churches and a slight net loss (3%) to nonaffiliation. Thus, conservative Protestant churches are growing because their birthrate is well above replacement
and because they mostly hang onto these kids. The liberal churches are well below replacement fecundity,
suffer significant net losses to nonaffiliation, and have
lost their attractiveness as vehicles of status mobility.
One study is a grossly insufficient test of the costlyinformation hypothesis, but it exemplifies the pattern
it predicts; decision making and selection are both important in this case. There is a nice irony in the discovery that the success of conservative Protestants stems
in large part from natural selection.
p a t r i c e te l t s e r
Department of Sociology and Anthropology, Lehigh
University, Bethlehem, Pa. 18015, U.S.A. 8 ix 97
Boone and Smith’s critique of evolutionary archaeology
centers on its failure to accommodate the empirical
consequences of cultural transmission. Evolutionary archaeologists maintain that natural selection acts on
heritable (genetic or cultural) phenotypic (physiological
or behavioral) variation contributing to an individual’s
fitness. This position runs into problems. Natural selection is tied to reproductive success, and because it is
confined to parent-offspring relationships it is constrained by the rate at which biological organisms reproduce. Cultural transmission, however, is not confined to parent-offspring relationships, it does not
necessarily imply reproduction, and behavioral change
within populations can occur more rapidly than biological generations reproduce. The consequences of this position are significant but unnecessary. Evolutionary
ecologists maintain that natural selection accounts for
phenotypic plasticity—in this case cognitive abilities
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enabling organisms to vary their behavior in response
to environmental change. Thus, whereas evolutionary
archaeology identifies directional changes in trait frequencies as the result of natural selection, evolutionary
ecology might attribute the same changes to adaptive
adjustments (phenotypic variation).
While I agree with the central conclusions of Boone
and Smith’s critique, they raise many issues requiring
clarification and refinement from both sides. The two
fields have quite different points of departure—evolutionary ecology from an ethnographic perspective, evolutionary archaeology from an archaeological one.
These differences incorporate long-term concerns over
different methodological issues. The question what is
or can be observed goes far beyond the role of behavioral
reconstruction to a concern with identifying appropriate units of measurement, the perspective of timescale, and more mundane issues such as chronological
resolution. Consequently, what Boone and Smith might
regard as a flawed grasp of evolutionary biology may reflect a more sophisticated methodological appreciation
than they recognize.
Their example of the snowmobile and the horse (e.g.,
Ramenofsky 1995; Winterhalder 1980, 1981) provides a
useful illustration for many points. In the Plains example, the perspective of a broader time-scale with which
archaeologists generally operate reveals an unprecedented population, suggesting more than phenotypic
adjustment. For example, horses and related technology
effectively raised the carrying capacity of the Plains environment, providing the means to support higher population densities than were previously possible. While
the source of people included refugee populations, the
viability and persistence of higher population densities
should reflect something about reproductive fitness.
Boone and Smith’s basic argument—that adoption of
the horses can be best understood in terms of adaptive
decision-making rules—remains cogent, however, and
the difference underscores one of their critical points.
By refusing to recognize the relevance of any mechanisms to effect phenotypic adjustments (e.g., decisionmaking rules), evolutionary archaeologists are at a loss
to account for the mechanisms underlying selection. As
Boone and Smith argue, in the absence of the ‘‘postulate
that evolved cognitive abilities allow foragers to weigh
the economic costs and benefits . . . and to choose
[which one] gives the highest energy return . . . the intimate strategic relationship between foraging technology and diet breadth would remain theoretically
opaque.’’
Criticism of the evolutionary archaeological position
on undirected variation and human intention is more
a matter of what constitutes the ‘‘innovation’’ than a
fundamental theoretical disagreement. Evolutionary archaeologists identify the European introduction of
horses and associated technology to the North American continent as the ‘‘innovation.’’ In this context, it is
unlikely that the Europeans’ intention was to provide
Native Americans with the means to remain viable
populations. If I understand them correctly, evolution-

ary ecologists would identify the innovation as the incorporation of horses and associated technology into a
new behavioral context. In this case their criticism
would be justified. The evolutionary archaeologists’ position does not imply a theory of unintended consequences, but given what they identify as the innovation
it often turns out that way. More to the point, however,
their position on human intention and innovation is
better explained as a reaction to the privileged position
and causal role these mechanisms have been given by
more firmly entrenched models of cultural evolution.
Boone and Smith seem to recognize this issue without
fully appreciating its significance.
Nevertheless, while attempting to create a distance
between Darwinian and cultural explanations, evolutionary archaeologists may have become victims of
their own rhetoric and, as Boone and Smith suggest,
‘‘thrown the baby out with the bath water.’’ The tendency to trivialize functional explanations and privilege
evolutionary ones is pervasive in the evolutionary archaeological literature and undermines its proponents’
ability to provide a clear accounting for the mechanisms underlying selection. While attempting to expunge behavior in response to the inductive epistemological strategy they have adopted they have somehow
forgotten to include that theoretical principles must be
written in behavioral terms, that archaeologists must
invent the methodology (Binford 1964) to apply them,
and that behavioral inferences are explanations (Neiman 1990).
In sum, evolutionary archaeologists face significant
limitations in their failure to accommodate the empirical consequences of cultural transmission. To address
these issues may require shedding some hazardous rhetoric currently associated with the program rather than
necessarily retreating from any basic theoretical premises. Failure to do so will deny them access to a theory
of behavior consistent with Darwinian principles and
some much-needed methodological equipment.

Reply
e r i c a l d e n s m i t h a n d j a m e s l. b o o n e
Seattle, Wash./Albuquerque, N.M., U.S.A. 15 xi 97
The diversity of reactions to our article mirrors the controversy and lack of agreement that characterize the
evolutionary study of human behavior and culture. This
suggests that the sample of commentators is a representative one, but it of course does not facilitate a compact
reply. We have grouped our responses under five headings: the definition of natural selection, the explanatory
logic of phenotypic adaptation, the relative causal efficacy of each of these forces in shaping human behavior
and its products, the effects of temporal scale and historicity, and the problem of explaining complex social
processes and institutions.
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What is natural selection? Dennett wants the concept of natural selection to cover all cases where hereditary variation is transmitted differentially through
time. Thus, people choosing snowmobiles over snowshoes or cows with higher milk yield are engaging in
‘‘a subvariety of natural selection’’ called ‘‘intentional
selection.’’ Our primary purpose in distinguishing phenotypic adaptation (including forms involving intentionality) from natural selection (including forms involving cultural inheritance) is to highlight the very
different dynamics and causal processes involved in
these two forms of change. Insisting that we lump all
these things under the rubric of ‘‘natural selection’’ is a
semantic game, since after all we must ultimately distinguish them from each other in order to understand
how they work. And, frankly, we think that the conceptual distinctions established in Boyd and Richerson
(1985: esp. 174 ff.) between natural selection (of genetic
or cultural variation) and such factors as guided variation or biased transmission are more useful than the
lumping advocated by Dennett.
Is phenotypic adaptation descriptive or explanatory?
The comment by Hunt, Madsen, and Lipo indicates that
some evolutionary archaeologists are still unable or unwilling to understand the logic of behavioral ecology
and phenotypic adaptation. Hunt et al. fault us for making a claim—that natural selection has designed organisms to be able to assess environmental conditions and
vary their behavior adaptively, rather than behaving
randomly and letting selection sort things out—that in
their view is ‘‘empirical, not theoretical,’’ and in need
of substantiation. We have already suggested that the
empirical evidence for this claim is overwhelming and
referred readers to the literature in behavioral ecology.
Hunt et al. attempt to refute us on our own grounds by
quoting from a key work in behavioral ecology (Stephens and Krebs 1986), but, curiously, the phrases they
quote are precisely about how natural selection has designed organisms to engage in phenotypic adaptation.
We feel that Hunt et al. are the ones confused about
the difference between (empirical) description and
(theoretical) explanation. The explanatory models of
behavioral ecology (e.g., the prey-choice model, the
polygyny-threshold model) are middle-level theoretical
constructs, deductively linked to more fundamental
theories of neo-Darwinism (as discussed in any textbook on evolutionary biology or animal behavior).
These models are used to generate testable hypotheses,
which are then evaluated with empirical evidence; the
results either (provisionally) support the models or lead
to model revision or abandonment. The extent to which
(a) natural selection has designed structures of phenotypic adaptation, (b) organisms employ these structures
in the way predicted by behavioral ecology models, and
(c) such phenotypic adaptation is similar to but faster
than natural selection is subject to empirical evaluation. But the logical devices used to generate these empirical claims—the middle-level models and deductive
links to neo-Darwinism noted above—are theoretical
structures. Rather than engaging in imperious state-

ments about what is ‘‘non-Darwinian,’’ ‘‘confused empiricism,’’ ‘‘historical science,’’ ‘‘untestable behavioral
reconstructions,’’ ‘‘reification,’’ and so on—what we
might call confusing slogans with theory—Hunt et al.
should have pointed to some empirical evidence supporting their faith that natural selection directly shapes
the archaeological record. Their failure to do so is not a
good sign for the future of unreconstructed evolutionary
archaeology.
Can phenotypic adaptation short-circuit natural selection? Evolution by natural selection is a process that
shapes diversity when there are (a) replicators with
(b) high copying fidelity and (c) differential replication
success as a result of (d) interaction with some aspect(s)
of the environment. We agree that cultural replicators
(memes) sometimes meet all these criteria and hence
that culture is sometimes subject to evolution by natural selection. But the central thrust of our article was
that, contrary to evolutionary archaeological dogma,
natural selection is not the only or necessarily the primary mechanism of cultural or behavioral change over
time.
Leonard agrees in part but still wants natural selection (as well as drift and ‘‘sorting’’) to rule when change
is considered over longer periods—‘‘a few thousand
years or so’’—and when replicators ‘‘exhibit differential
success in response to changing environmental conditions.’’ Under these conditions, he argues, ‘‘intent and
individual or group efforts to direct the course of evolution are irrelevant at this scale, as the generation of variation, however knowledgeable and directed, is independent of natural selection.’’ But, as we argued at length,
this gambit has little logical force. First, phenotypic adaptation is capable of responding to ‘‘changing environmental conditions’’ and indeed can be expected to do so
more rapidly than natural selection does. Thus, if the
pace of environmental change which Leonard invokes
is not too rapid to confound evolution by natural selection, it cannot be too rapid to confound phenotypic adaptation. If successful (if people’s estimates, decision
rules, and phenotypic programs do indeed produce adaptive change), then phenotypic adaptation will remove
the selective differentials that are essential to the action
of natural selection; as we phrased it earlier, natural selection will be short-circuited. This is not an antiDarwinian position but rather a phenomenon recognized by virtually all evolutionists who study behavior.
Second, the requirement that variation be generated
independently of selection applies to replicators; but in
a Darwinian world it cannot sensibly apply to phenotypic variants. Neither natural selection nor phenotypes can anticipate the future in any thorough way.
But phenotypes (organisms) can respond to many environmental changes in adaptive ways, without waiting
for genetic or cultural change; indeed, they are designed
(by a history of natural selection) to do so. We of course
recognize that people are not always adaptively successful in their strategizing, either because they do not have
sufficient information to know what choices (e.g., plant
early, plant late) will result in the best phenotypic pay-
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off (e.g., harvest yield) or because they are faithfully executing genetic or cultural instructions that have been
fixed by past genetic and cultural evolution but are not
adaptive to novel environmental conditions (points
made by Ramenofsky and Mithen). In these latter situations, natural selection and the other evolutionary
forces may indeed prove decisive; but this outcome cannot be decided a priori or dogmatically as the evolutionary archaeological literature has been all too ready to
do. Rather, it must be studied empirically and theoretically with great care before we can conclude much
about the relative strength of the two mechanisms of
adaptation.
The spread of snowmobiles among Cree and other
northern peoples and of horses among Indians of the
Great Plains are cases in point. While Ramenofsky
agrees that the one-generation spread of snowmobiles is
too rapid to be explained by natural selection, she apparently still defends her suggestion that the spread of
domesticated horses among the Plains Indians ‘‘over
approximately 100 years’’ is due to ‘‘Darwinian
selection.’’ But 100 years is also far too rapid for natural
selection to account for the spread of a trait amongst
diverse Indian nations over a vast area, as elementary
calculations will reveal, so we do not see the point of
distinguishing snowmobiles and horses on these
grounds. True, adoption of horses, by greatly reducing
search and transport costs for buffalo hunting (as well
as giving decisive military advantages), increased the
Plains carrying capacity and ‘‘reflect[s] something about
reproductive fitness,’’ as Teltser puts it. But attention
to the ethnohistoric and linguistic record (sources of evidence typically absent from archaeological contexts)
indicates that most of the Plains equestrians were derived from non-Plains peoples who immigrated to the
Plains when the horse opened up a new niche. While
certainly there was some expansion of equestrians relative to nonequestrians (e.g., village horticulturalists
like the Mandan and Pawnee) via differential reproduction, which suggests that natural selection could be part
of the explanation for the spread of the horse, we believe
the evidence indicates that it was primarily due to decision making guided by evolved preferences (for increased food, military security, and status).
As Kodack notes, although Winterhalder did not test
hypotheses about the reasons for Cree adoption of
snowmobiles, some literature does exist that suggests
that Cree and others made this choice on the basis of
the kinds of efficiency considerations that are central to
the logic of foraging theory (as reviewed in Smith 1991:
chap. 9). If correct, this is a good illustration of the general point made in our article that phenotypic adaptation may often act to short-circuit natural selection; dog
teams (or snowshoes) and snowmobiles competed in
phenotypic rather than evolutionary time, and by the
time the competition was over (in less than a generation) there was no artifact variation (let alone heritable
variation in the correct Darwinian sense) left to be
‘‘grist for the evolutionary mill.’’
What happens to ecology in evolutionary time? Sev-

eral of the commentators (Leonard, Jones, Hunt et al.)
seem to imply that the evolutionary ecological approach is somehow more appropriate to synchronic or
very short-term change. For example, Leonard suggests
that evolutionary ecological explanations are fine for
‘‘contemporary and historic peoples in a synchronic
framework’’ but a diachronic perspective requires a
shift to a ‘‘timelike’’ framework. In a similar vein, Hunt
et al. appear to question our ‘‘imagining that differential
persistence in the long term can simply be conceived in
spacelike (functional) terms.’’ Why can’t it be? As long
as the selective conditions that gave rise to a set of decision rules governing phenotypic response are in place,
the same range of adaptive strategies will continue to
be played out indefinitely. Phenotypic adaptation occurs continuously. Natural selection on variation occurs continuously. Time scale is not the issue here. To
see why, try to imagine a theoretically derivable rule
that would specify the exact point in a time continuum
when phenotypic adaptation ‘‘stops’’ and evolution
‘‘starts’’ (hence the title of our article). The real difference in the two approaches is the way in which units
and variables are defined and employed in theory
building.
The comments of Leonard and of Hunt et al. both imply that the explanatory structures of evolutionary ecology and evolutionary archaeology differ to the point
where they are hardly comparable. Specifically, they
adopt Dunnell’s position that evolutionary theory employs a timelike theory while ecology is spacelike in its
structure. According to Dunnell’s (1982: 9–10) original
formulation of this distinction, predictive statements
are possible when theories are constructed in ‘‘timespace free’’ units and variables. Evolutionary theory, he
argues, is time-like because the morphological and behavioral configuration of a particular organism at a
given point in time is, in the last analysis, the product
of its specific evolutionary history—a history full of
contingencies and quirks that are unpredictable. Hence,
evolutionary trajectories are unpredictable—as Dunnell
has recently put it, ‘‘cause [in evolutionary change] is
historically contingent, thus explanation must be historical as well’’ (Dunnell 1996b:5). To put the problem
in more concrete terms, one cannot look at a population
of Devonian amphibians and predict that porcupines or
parrots will evolve in the Tertiary. A myriad of historical contingencies (for example, global climate change,
tectonic plate movements) will have intervened to produce the specific evolutionary trajectories that result in
the life-forms we observe today. Certainly we do not
deny the necessity of taking historical contingency into
account when producing narrative descriptions of historical change, evolutionary or otherwise. We question,
however, the wisdom of restricting evolutionary explanation to this specific historical level of generality; this
in effect makes phylogenetic reconstruction the only
goal of evolutionary analysis.
As we hope our article has made clear, evolutionary
ecology defines units and variables in more general
‘‘time-space-free’’ terms that allow predictive state-
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ments to be made about the form that behavioral and
morphological strategies will take under specified environmental conditions. For example, in foraging theory,
the relevant units include predator and prey type; relevant variables include search and handling time and
food value. These units are time- and space-free in that
they apply generally to any species, time, or place. This
kind of theory building is not limited to ‘‘ecology.’’ Sexual selection theory, first developed by Darwin (1859
and esp. 1871) and since greatly elaborated (e.g., Andersson 1994, Ryan 1997), is constructed in an analogous
fashion. The units are males and females; variables include mate preferences, competitive ability, and phenotypic quality. Thus, if we want to explain why peacocks
have evolved elaborate tails for sexual display while
bullfrogs use croaks, we must deal in phylogenetic analysis and historical contingency. But this has not prevented behavioral ecologists from developing generalized predictive theories about the form and frequency
of sexually selected displays (see Neiman [1990:42–46,
58–60] for further discussion of this general issue and a
critique of the position that evolutionary theory requires a different kind of metaphysic from other ‘‘hard’’
sciences).
Can evolutionary ecology deal with complex social
phenomena? Both Earle and Mithen fault evolutionary
ecology for failing to deal with complex social institutions and processes. This is a significant charge, both
because of the obvious importance of such phenomena
in human history and prehistory and because evolutionary archaeologists sometimes claim to have uncovered
a scalar phenomenon of group selection in complex societies (e.g., Dunnell 1980). It is certainly true that to
date evolutionary ecology’s primary contributions to
analyzing human behavior have focused on individuallevel behavior and relatively simple socioeconomic systems. This is partly because of evolutionary ecology’s
commitment to methodological individualism—the
notion that properties of groups (social institutions,
populations, societies, etc.) are products of the actions
of its individual members (Elster 1983; Smith and Winterhalder 1992b:39)—and partly because in any new
field of study it makes sense to start with simple and
tractable problems. But there is in fact a growing body
of literature in human behavioral ecology that deals
with social relationships, interdependencies, conflicts
of interest, multiple goals and currencies (e.g., nutrition, status, and mating opportunities), and even ‘‘emergent properties’’ of social systems (e.g., Boone 1986,
1998; Dickemann 1979; Neiman 1997; Hawkes 1996;
Hill and Hurtado 1995; Rodseth et al. 1991; Winterhalder 1990; reviews in Boone 1992, Borgerhoff Mulder
1992, Rogers 1992, Smith 1992). Readers should not
mistake the examples we cited in our article, which
were chosen for heuristic simplicity, for the present
(Mithen) or possible (Earle) scope of human behavioral
ecology.
Earle is surprised that we ‘‘ignore processual archaeology’’ and its attempts to ‘‘explain the development of
social institutions.’’ Our article, however, was clearly

advertised as a critique of evolutionary archaeology of
the ‘‘selectionist’’ variety from the theoretical standpoint of evolutionary ecology. An evaluation of processual archaeology (or cultural ecology) from this
standpoint requires a separate treatment (see O’Connell
1995 for some work along those lines) and would reveal
antagonistic as well as complementary or convergent
relations between processualism and evolutionary
ecology.
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